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JUSTIFYING MINORITY
PREFERENCES IN
BROADCASTING*
BY
MATTHEW L. SPrZEzR**
I. INTRODUCTION
In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,1 the Supreme Court upheld two Fed-
eral Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") policies
designed to increase the number of broadcasting stations owned by racial
and ethnic minorities and, to a lesser extent, women. The FCC, prodded
by early decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeal for the District of
Columbia,2 has claimed for almost two decades that by increasing the
diversity of ownership of the airwaves it will increase the diversity of
programming content. Hence, these policies-termed "minority prefer-
ence policies"-are justified as a method of diversifying broadcasting
content and not as a matter of remedying any past or present discrimina-
tion. In Metro Broadcasting the majority found more than enough evi-
dence of a nexus between minority ownership of broadcasting stations
and broadcast programming diversity to allow Congress and the FCC to
adopt these policies. The dissent took a completely different view of the
evidence (as well as everything else) and found that it was totally insuffi-
cient to justify the minority preference policies.'
* 0 1990 Matthew L. Spitzer. All rights reserved.
** William T. Dalessi Professor of Law, University of Southern California; Visiting Professor
of Social Science, California Institute of Technology. I received valuable help from Antoinette
Cook, Wilhelmina Cooke, Erwin Chemerinsky, Richard Craswell, Gary W. Cox, David Haddock,
Thomas Hazlett, Margaret Radin, Florence Setzer, Pablo Spiller, and all of the pdrticipants at work-
shops on this Article at the University of Chicago Law and Economics Workshop, the Hoover Insti-
tute, the University of Illinois Department of Economics, the Yale University School of
Organization and Management, and the 1989 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference.
1. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
2. West Mich. Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1027 (1985); TV 9 v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 144-97. The split between the majority and dissent was
preceded by similar disagreements in the courts below. In March 1989, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued two decisions, one striking down one of the
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In this Article, I will concentrate on the justification for the minor-
ity preference policies-the purported connection between a broadcast
station owner's race or sex and the owner's programming decisions. Do
white males really program differently from black, Hispanic, Asian/
Pacific Islander, Alaskan/American Indian, or female owners? If so,
when and in what ways is this likely to be true?4
Before I begin answering these questions, however, I should high-
light the nature of my enterprise. The Supreme Court accepted the
FCC's justification of the minority preference policies on the theory that
minority owners and female owners will program a different mix of mate-
rial than will white male owners. This immediately raises two questions.
First, why not just require broadcasters, regardless of race or sex, to pro-
gram the special material that the FCC hopes minority and female own-
ers will choose to put on the air? This would avoid the need for explicit
racial classifications in the law. Second, why not justify the minority
preference policies directly on the grounds that minorities and women
have been victims of past discrimination and that these policies remedy
past discrimination? This would avoid the need to show a relationship
between owners' ethnic or sexual characteristics and programming
choice.
Neither of the above questions can help us avoid the basic inquiry in
this Article. First, directly requiring broadcasters to program special
material presumably runs afoul of either the first amendment's guarantee
of freedom of speech and press5 or the Communication Act's prohibition
of censorship.6 The majority opinion in Metro Broadcasting held that
minority preference policies, Shurberg Broadcasting v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd
sub nom., Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990), and the other decision upholding
another minority preference policy, Winter Park Communications v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir.
1989), aff'd sub nom., Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
4. This is part of a somewhat broader question about the relationship between owners' char-
acteristics and programming. Eg., H. LEVIN, FAcT AND FANCY IN TELEVISION REGULATION
(1980); Hale & Vincent, Locally Produced Programming on Independent Television Stations, 63 J.
QUART. 562 (1986); Wirth, Assured Diversity Is Needed, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 29, 1984, at 4, col. 5
(discussing multiple-ownership rules).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988). It is true that the FCC has, at many times in its history, imposed
many content-based requirements on broadcasters, particularly in the area of nonentertainment pro-
gramming. See Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295 (FCC 1960) (report and
statement of policy) (requiring programming in 14 different categories, including programs for chil-
dren, religious programs, educational programs, public affairs, editorials, politics, agriculture, news,
weather, market reports, sports, minority programming, local self-expression, programs with local
talent, and entertainment). Breaking down minority programming into the very narrow, specific
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first amendment considerations mixed with considerations of administra-
tive convenience relieve the FCC of any duty to try the racially neutral
alternative of direct content control.7 Second, because neither the Com-
mission nor Congress has ever justified the minority preference policies
as remedial measures, neither the FCC nor Congress has ever developed
a factual record that might support the remedial claim.' Therefore,
because the Court correctly held that the FCC cannot directly require
minority programming, and because there is no factual record for any
claim that the minority preference policies are remedial, 9 the minority
categories needed to implement the minority preference policies directly, however, would be going
too far.
There is also a secondary question. If the FCC may not constitutionally require minority pro-
gramming directly, may the Commission justify the minority preference policies as an attempt to
foster that diversity indirectly? Although the reader's instinctive response may be no, there are
examples involving governmental involvement in communications in which the answer may be yes.
For example, the government may set up a free speech area so as to foster a robust political debate,
hoping that proponents of many different views will speak, but under the first amendment no one
speaker may be required to offer any particular view. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37
(1983).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 176-77.
8. In fact, at hearings before the Telecommunications Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, witnesses suggested developing such a factual record
and offered to help do so. Minority Ownership of Broadcast Stations: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Hearing] (statements of John Payton, James L. Winston, Executive
Director and General Counsel of the National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters, and Percy
E. Sutton).
9. Everyone agrees that, if a governmental unit has discriminated against minorities, it may
lawfully use explicit racial guidelines to remedy that discrimination. However, the FCC has never
claimed to have discriminated in the past, and it is not clear how the parties would go about proving
such a thing if they were to try to do so. In the testimony at the Senate hearings, only one person
even mentioned the possibility that the FCC had been guilty of discrimination, and he said that he
knew of no evidence to support such an allegation. See id. (testimony of Allan Shurberg). If the
FCC were subjected to nothing much more searching than the majority approach in Metro Broad-
casting, it might carry its burden. Broadcast historians could probably be found to testify that dur-
ing the 1950s the FCC was staffed by right-wing, racist Eisenhower appointees who would not even
give licenses to rich, white Democrats. During this time the vast majority of valuable television
licenses were handed out. Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chancellor's Foot, 47 GEO. L.J.
655, 690-94 (1959). These commissioners, the historians would claim, would not have given the time
of day, much less a valuable broadcast license, to a minority applicant. I have no clue as to the
sources upon which they might rely. I made a first pass at the historical sources and found no direct
evidence of racism on the part of the FCC.
On the other hand, if the FCC were to be subjected to some stricter burden of proof, proving
past discrimination would be difficult. First, I suspect that very few minorities applied for licenses
during the 1950s. I have found no historical evidence upon this point, and I know of no evidence to
suggest the contrary. (This is a rational response to discrimination. Applying for a license is quite
costly, and if the probability of getting the license is zero, it is irrational to apply.) However, in
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), Justice O'Connor indicated that, at a minimum,
the government must compare the rate at which minorities applied for rights to the rate at which
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preference policies must stand or fall upon the relationship between
female or minority ownership and programming.10
My investigation of the possible relationship between female and
minority ownership and programming will not ascertain whether or not
there is enough evidence to satisfy a skeptical social scientist that the
relationship exists. (I strongly suspect that there is not.) Instead, I will
evaluate the theory and evidence of program choice against the back-
ground of the differing legal standards used by the majority and dissent
in Metro Broadcasting. I will show that the distinction between the
majority's and dissent's appraisals of the evidence flows directly from
their different normative and jurisprudential approaches to explicit racial
classifications.
In this Article, I will outline the content of the minority preference
policies, pausing only briefly to review their history. Then I will present
a basic model of programming choice by profit-maximizing broadcasters
and modify it to incorporate the race and sex of the broadcast station
owner. The model will reveal two possible reasons why minority and
female owners might choose to program differently from white males.11
they were awarded to show discrimination. Id. at 498-503; see infra notes 192-93 and accompanying
text. O'Connor's test would suggest that opponents of the minority preferences would be allowed to
"explain" the lack of minority licenses by the lack of minority applicants, rather than by any govern-
mental discrimination. Second, the multicriteria choice process used to award broadcast licenses
muddies the water a great deal. Any decision to refuse to grant a license to a minority can be
explained by other criteria in the decision.
10. Previous works discussing the minority preference policies have failed to inquire about the
actual relationship between ownership characteristics and programming. Eg., Devins, Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEx. L. REv. 125 (1990); Honig, The
FCC and Its Fluctuating Commitment to Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 27 How. L.J.
859 (1984); Weissman, The FCC and Minorities: An Evaluation of FCC Policies Designed to
Encourage Programming Responsive to Minority Needs, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 561 (1981);
Wimmer, Deregulation and Market Failure in Minority Programming: The Socioeconomic Dimen-
sions of Broadcast Reform, 8 CoMM./ENT. L.J. 329 (1986). One article critiques the tax-certificate
policy on the ground that some or all of the benefits from a tax certificate may go to the (presumed)
nonminority seller, rather than the minority purchaser. Wilde, FCC Tax Certificates for Minority
Ownership of Broadcast Facilities: A Critical Reexamination of Policy, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 979, 1013
(1990). However, the main purpose of the tax-certificate program is to increase the number of
broadcasting stations owned by minorities. This will happen only to the extent that some of the
benefits from a tax certificate are retained by the seller. If a seller retains no benefit at all, it will have
no special incentive to sell to a minority purchaser.
See also Hilliard, Constitutional Conflict Over Race and Gender Preferences in Commercial
Radio and Television Licensing, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 343 (1990) (contending that all FCC policies
have failed to produce diversity and suggesting that 10% of all station licenses up for renewal be
revoked and reallocated through a lottery); Comment, The Constitutionality of the FCC's Use of
Race and Sex in the Granting of Broadcast Licenses, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 665 (1989) (authored by
Timothy G. Gauger).
11. For the purposes of this Article, I presume that white males are profit maximizers.
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Minority and female owners might give up some profits to satisfy a taste
for specialized programming. Alternatively, minority and female owners
might have a cost advantage at broadcasting programs targeted to their
own groups. Next, I will review the data on the connection between
ownership characteristics and programming choice. This data most
likely supports the two possible reasons why minority and female owners
program differently from white males, but the data cannot give any hint
of how strong these differences might be, nor can the data completely
rule out the possibility that there is no difference in programming choices
between different types of owners. Last, I will review the majority and
dissenting opinions in Metro Broadcasting, contrast the different treat-
ments of the theory and evidence in the two opinions, and then briefly
suggest an intermediate approach in which the insights from market-
based models would play a much larger role in the justification of the
minority preference policies.
II. THE MINORITY PREFERENCE POLICIES
Every broadcaster in the United States of America must have a
license from the FCC.12 A broadcast license for radio expires after seven
years and for television after five years, at which time the broadcaster
must renew the license to continue broadcasting.13 There are two basic
methods of obtaining a broadcast license: direct grant from the FCC and
purchase from an existing licensee.
The FCC employs two different procedures to grant licenses. First,
the FCC holds comparative hearings to award radio and television
licenses to applicants. When several applicants ask the FCC for the same
license, 4 the FCC compares several relevant characteristics of the appli-
cants, combines the comparisons to form an overall evaluation of which
broadcaster would best serve the "public interest," and then awards the
12. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
13. Id. § 307(c) (1988).
14. This can happen both at the first award of a license or at renewal time if one or more
challengers contests the renewal. Id. § 309 (1988).
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license to the best applicant. 5 "Comparative criteria" include diversifi-
cation of ownership of mass media, integration of ownership with man-
agement, and technical virtuosity. 16 Second, the FCC grants certain
types of licenses, particularly low-power television licenses, by lottery.
Sales of broadcasting licenses usually generate far less administra-
tive process. Buyers and sellers are usually introduced through bro-
kers, 7 and the FCC is precluded by statute from considering any
potential broadcaster other than the proposed buyer when approving the
sale. As long as the new owner seems acceptable, the FCC must approve
its license. 8
The FCC enforces four minority preference policies. Two of
them-the minority and female merit in comparative hearings and the
lottery preference-apply to FCC license grants. The other two-the
distress sale and the tax certificate-apply to license sales.
A. MINORITY AND FEMALE MERIT IN COMPARATIVE HEARINGS
The terms "enhancement" 9 and "merit"2 are used to describe any
datum that suggests one of several applicants for a broadcasting license is
preferable under a particular criterion used in the comparative hearing.
Prompted by TV 9 v. FCC,2  the FCC awards a merit under the diversifi-
cation-of-ownership criterion to an applicant if a substantial percentage
of the applicant is owned by one or more minorities. In TV 9 the FCC
asserted that, because the Federal Communications Act was "color-
blind," the FCC would take an applicant's race into account only to the
extent that the applicant could show that its owner's race would likely
lead to better, more diverse programming in the particular case. The
D.C. Circuit reversed, essentially requiring the FCC to award a merit to
15. See Central Fla. Enters. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S.
957 (1979); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 923 (1971); Spitzer, Radio Formats by Administrative Choice, 47 U. Crii. L. REv. 647
(1980).
16. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
17. Pick up any copy of Broadcasting Magazine and leaf through the classified section at the
back to view the numerous ads by brokers.
18. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1988).
19. West Mich. Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1027 (1985).
20. See Central Fla. Enters. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S.
957 (1979).
21. 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
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all minority applicants without any demonstration that the award would
improve programming service.22
The FCC not only complied with the TV 9 ruling, but just four
years later extended the case's application to women.23 However, the
FCC decided to extend "a merit of lesser significance ' 24 in these cases
because women, unlike racial minorities, have not been "excluded from
the mainstream of society" due to prior discrimination.25 Just as in TV
9, the FCC required no proof of connection between female ownership
and diversity in program content.
B. TAX CERTIFICATES
In 1978 the FCC adopted two policies designed to stimulate the sale
of broadcasting stations to minorities because "[flull minority participa-
tion in the ownership and management of broadcast facilities results in a
more diverse selection of programming. ' '26 The first policy called for the
FCC to issue special tax certificates to sellers when a station was sold to
"parties with a significant minority interest. ' 27 A tax certificate allowed
the seller to defer any capital gain tax on the sale. This policy gave the
seller a substantial incentive to seek out qualified minority buyers and
accept offers from minority buyers even where the minorities offered less
money than prospective white purchasers.
The FCC has reported that it has issued 178 tax certificates since the
inception of the program and that the program is being used with greater
frequency. 28 The Los Angeles Times reports that Geraldo Rivera and
four partners are spending hundreds of millions of dollars to assemble a
new broadcast network utilizing tax certificates.29
The same year that the FCC adopted the tax-certificate policy and
the distress-sale policy for minorities, it refused to extend either policy to
women. In a moderately surprising change of position, the FCC issued
the following statement:
22. Id. at 938.
23. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 69 F.C.C.2d 607, 652 (1978) (reviewing an application for a
construction permit for a new television broadcast station).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979,
981 (1978) [hereinafter Minority Ownership Policy].
27. Id. at 983.
28. FCC Press Release (Mar. 9, 1989).
29. McDougal, There's a New Geraldo... Sort Of, L.A. Times, Mar. 5, 1989, Calendar, at 3.
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[W]hile receptive to factual showings in specific cases which indicate a
need for preferential incentives to encourage female involvement/own-
ership, we have not concluded that the historical and contemporary
disadvantagement suffered by women is of the same order, or has the
same contemporary consequences, which would justify inclusion of a
majority of the nation's population in a preferential category defined
by the presence of "minority groups." 30
C. DimEss SALES
When the FCC announced the tax-certificate policy, it also
announced the distress-sale policy. Under the distress-sale policy, the
FCC would approve the transfer of any license designated for revocation
hearing or for renewal hearing on basic qualification issues where minor-
ity buyers purchased the station before the start of the hearing and paid
no more than seventy-five percent of fair market value. 31 The minority
purchaser could apparently take the license free of the taint that occa-
sioned the hearing. This policy obviously gave licensees in danger of los-
ing their licenses an incentive to seek out minority purchasers.
Furthermore, the price ceiling of seventy-five percent of fair market value
gave minority purchasers an incentive to seek out licensees in trouble.
The FCC has reported that the distress-sale policy has been used fewer
than forty times since its inception, far less often than the tax-certificate
policy.32 As indicated previously, the FCC has refused to extend the
distress-sale policy to female purchasers.
D. LOTTERY PREFERENCES
In 1981 Congress amended section 309(i) of the Federal Communi-
cations Act and granted discretion to the FTC to award broadcast
licenses by lottery, directing the FCC t6 "establish rules and procedures
to ensure that, in the administration of any system of random selection
under this subsection, groups or organizations, or members of groups or
organizations, which are underrepresented in the ownership of telecom-
munications facilities or properties will be granted significant prefer-
ences." 33 The Conference Report accompanying the bill included the
following language:
30. National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 69 F.C.C.2d 1591, 1593
n.9 (1978) (petition for issuance of policy statement or notice of inquiry).
31. Minority Ownership Policy, supra note 26, at 983.
32. See FCC Press Release, supra note 28.
33. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1242, 95 Stat. 736, 736-
37 (1981) (concerning television and radio broadcasting).
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[I]t is the firm intention of the conferees that ownership by minorities,
such as blacks and Hispanics, as well as by women, and ownership by
other under-represented groups, such as labor unions and community
organizations, is to be encouraged through the award of significant
preferences in any such random selection proceeding. These are
groups which are inadequately represented in terms of nationwide tele-
communications ownership, and it is the intention of the conferees in
establishing a random selection process that the objective of increasing
the number of media outlets owned by such persons or groups be
met.a4
The FCC claimed the lottery statute was too vague and refused to
implement any such scheme. The FCC requested that Congress provide
a new, more specific mandate. In 1982 Congress responded by passing
new subsection 309(i)(3)(C)(ii), which provided that "[t]he term 'minor-
ity group' includes blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, Alaska Natives,
Asians, *and Pacific Islanders. 3a  In addition, Congress amended
309(i)(3)(A) to direct that
significant preferences will be granted to applicants or groups of appli-
cants, the grant to which of the license or permit would increase the
diversification of ownership of the media of mass communications. To
further diversify the ownership of the media of mass communications,
an additional significant preference shall be granted to any applicant
controlled by a member or members of a minority group.
3 6
The FCC granted lottery preferences to the listed groups, plus those
owning no or very few other media interests.3 7  After a quite divisive
34. H.R. Rep. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 897 (1981).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(C)(ii) (1988).
36. 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(i)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1990). The conference report muddied the waters
a bit:
[I]t should be noted that such groups as women, labor unions, and community organiza-
tions which are mentioned in the legislative history of the lottery statute that was originally
adopted ... are all significantly underrepresented in the ownership of telecommunications
facilities. Such applicant groups would, of course, be eligible for both media ownership
and minority preferences if they meet the eligibility guidelines. The Conferees expect that
such groups will also substantially benefit from this lottery preferences scheme.
Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, § 115 (1982).
37. Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection from Among Certain Com-
peting Applications Using Random Selection or Lotteries Instead of Comparative Hearings, 93
F.C.C.2d 952 (1983) (second report and order).
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rule-making proceeding,38 the FCC decided not to give lottery prefer-
ences to women. 9
E. COURT CHALLENGES AND SUBSEQUENT HISTORY
1. West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
In 1984 the D.C. Circuit affirmed the legality of the minority prefer-
ence in comparative hearings in West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC.' Two applicants, West Michigan Broadcasting and Waters,
clashed over the award of an FM radio station in Hart, Michigan, a com-
munity with no significant black population. Waters, wholly owned by a
black woman, was granted the license, partly because of an enhancement
for the owner's race. West Michigan appealed and claimed that the
enhancement was illegal under the Federal Communications Act and the
due process clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution. Judge
Skelly Wright, writing for a unanimous court, turned aside both chal-
lenges. The court held that the enhancement in a comparative hearing
was lawful because the FCC was guided by the "public interest" stan-
dard embedded within the Federal Communications Act of 1934. Part of
the public interest included ensuring a diverse set of program offerings to
the public. The court stated that the TV 9 decision from ten years before
should be interpreted to require the FCC to assume that black owners
would present distinctive programming.41 Such programming was valua-
ble not only to satisfy the preferences of black audience, but also to
expose others to new points of view and ideas.4 2
38. Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection from Among Certain Com-
peting Applications Using Random Selection or Lotteries Instead of Comparative Hearings, 95
F.C.C.2d 432 (1983) (third notice of proposed rule making). The FCC asked if women could be
included in the lottery preference, either as a minority group or as a group owning few media inter-
ests. In response, the American Association of University Women, the American Women in Radio
and Television, the National Organization for Women Legal Defense Fund, and others said yes.
American Christian Television Systems, Citizens Communications Center (a Georgetown Univer-
sity-related public interest group), Black Citizens for a Fair Media, the National Conference of Black
Lawyers, and United Church of Christ all said no.
39. In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection from Among Certain
Competing Applications Using Random Selection or Lotteries Instead of Comparative Hearings, 58
RR 2d 1077 (1985) (The FCC read the new section 309 as precluding women from being included as
minorities for purpose of the lottery and hence decided to give no preferences in lottery to women.);
accord Pappas v. FCC, 807 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
40. West Mich. Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1027 (1985).
41. Particularly in news and public affairs. Id. at 610.
42. Id. at 610-11. The constitutional attack was turned away largely on the strength of two
Supreme Court decisions, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), and University of California
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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2. Steele v. FCC and the Aftermath
In 1985 the D.C. Circuit held unlawful the female preference in
comparative hearings in Steele v. FCC.43 The Steele opinion stated that
minority and female preferences rested on two assumptions: (1) that
minority and female owners have different tastes and preferences than do
white males and (2) that these tastes and preferences are manifested in
the programming choices of minority and female owners.' The opinion
regarded the first assumption as stereotyping and the second as empiri-
cally unlikely because programming decisions were more likely profit
driven than preference driven.45 The D.C. Circuit accepted these
assumptions in the case of minority preferences, but it was not willing to
do so for female preferences.
After the D.C. Circuit granted rehearing en banc in Steele, the FCC
changed its position and indicated that it no longer supported the minor-
ity and female preferences." The D.C. Circuit then remanded Steele,
along with two other cases, to allow the FCC to reconsider and further
investigate the factual predicates for the minority and female preferences
in comparative hearings. The FCC put out a Notice that it was rethink-
ing the entire area47 and also mailed detailed questionnaires to licensees,
requesting answers to questions on the relationship between ownership
characteristics and programming content.
The FCC received responses from approximately seventy-nine per-
cent of those questioned, but before the FCC could evaluate the
responses, Congress passed House Joint Resolution 395, which termi-
nated the inquiry and directed the FCC to use the preferences.48 The
FCC therefore terminated its inquiry, reinstated the licensing decisions in
43. 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 1198.
45. Id. at 1199.
46. See Leiby, The Female Merit Policy in Steele v. FC. "A Whim Leading to a Better
World?", 37 AM. U.L. REv. 379, 380 n.4 (1988).
47. See In re Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and
Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 FCC Red 1315
(1986); Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax Certifi-
cate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 52 Fed. Reg. 596 (FCC 1987)
(notice of inquiry).
48. H.R.J. Res. 395, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 Stat. 2216 (1987), contains the following rider:
[N]one of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to repeal, to retroactively apply
changes in, or to continue a reexamination of, the policies of the Federal Communications
Commission with respect to comparative licensing, distress sales and tax certificates... to
expand minority and women ownership of broadcasting licenses.
1991]
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the remanded cases in favor of the minority and female licensees,49 and
delivered the returned questionnaires to the Congressional Research Ser-
vice for analysis. The Congressional Research Service has since issued a
report that claims to find some support for the connection between own-
ership characteristics and programming choices. Two of the cases that
were remanded to the FCC during the Steele proceedings found their
way back to the D.C. Circuit. The court issued decisions in March 1989,
finding the distress-sale policy unconstitutional and the minority prefer-
ences in comparative hearings constitutional. Each decision contains
heated disagreements between the impaneled judges, and one of the main
points of contention is the relationship between minority and female
ownership and programming choices.5 0 The Supreme Court has
reviewed both cases in Metro Broadcasting51 and upheld the constitu-
tionality of the minority preference policies, basing its decision on the
relationship between ownership characteristics and programming
choices.
III. A SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO DETECTING THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERS'
CHARACTERISTICS AND PROGRAMMING
CHOICES
This part will propose a theory of programming choices by profit-
maximizing owners in broadcasting markets. The theory will then be
modified to take into account the race or sex of a broadcast station
owner. I will then evaluate the few studies that address the connection
between owners' characteristics and programming choices against the
theoretical background developed.
A. BASIC THEORY OF PROGRAM CHOICE BY RATIONAL PROFIT
MAXIMIZERS
This section will investigate the basic theory of program choice by
profit-maximizing owners, paying special attention to how and under
what circumstances such owners will choose to present minority-interest
programming rather than mass-appeal fare. The theoretical literature
49. See Applications of Metro Broadcasting, Rainbow Broadcasting Company, and Winter
Park Communications, 3 FCC Rcd 866 (1988).
50. Shurberg Broadcasting v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom., Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); Winter Park Communications v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347
(D.C. Cir. 1989); aff'd sub nor., Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
51. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
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has two parallel lines of analysis regarding the question of broadcast pro-
gramming. One set of articles, stemming from Steiner's paper Program
Patterns and Preferences and the Workability of Competition in Radio
Broadcasting,52 models radio broadcasting as a game among broadcasters
who are interested in gaining large audiences. 3 A second set of articles,
stemming from a paper by Spence and Owen,54 uses modem monopolis-
tic-competition theory to analyze the problem. 5
1. Steiner Models
a. Steiner's original article: Steiner wrote his article in an
effort to map the relationship between (monopolistic or competitive)
market structures in broadcasting and the "nature and quality of particu-
lar programs" produced by the industry. 6 Steiner took as given the
"three cornered" nature of the broadcasting industry: Broadcasters lure
audiences with programs and sell the audiences to advertisers, who in
turn show advertisements to the audiences. Audiences do not pay
directly for the broadcast programs. Given this framework, Steiner
asked his readers to make the following assumptions. First, once a pro-
gram has been broadcast, there is no additional cost of adding another
viewer.57 (In this sense, broadcasting is a public good.) There is one
time period in which a broadcaster must decide what to program. The
broadcaster can select one from a series of program "types" and will
make the choice so as to maximize the number of viewers for the station.
Each viewer wishes to watch one type of programming and will watch if
that type is aired. Otherwise, the viewer will not watch.
TABLE 1
PROGRAM TYPES
L, L 2  L 3  L4
Number of Viewers 210 75 50 31
52. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences and the Workability of Competition in Radio
Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194 (1952).
53. A substantial amount of time will be spent examining this theory because it is crucial to
subsequent discussion. Actually, Steiner's work derives from Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39
ECON. J. 41 (1929). For an excellent review of this literature, see B. EATON & R. LIPSEY, Product
Differentiation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 723 (1989).
54. Spence & Owen, Television Programming, Monopolistic Competition, and Welfare, 91 Q.J.
ECON. 103 (1977).
55. Less time is spent on these models because, for our purposes, they add little to the insights
from the Steiner models.
56. Steiner, supra note 52, at 195.
57. I will refer to both listeners and viewers as "viewers."
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The essence of Steiner's insight can be captured by the numerical
example in table 1. Assume that there are only four types of programs-
LI, L2, L 3, L47-and that there are 210 consumers who prefer LI, 75 who
prefer L2, 50 who prefer L3, and 31 who prefer L4. Given the model's
assumptions, consider the program mix that will be produced by one,
two, three, or four competitive broadcasters.
TABLE 2
PROGRAMS OFFERED BY COMPETITORS
1 L --
Number of 2 L, L -
Channels 3 L, L, L2
4 L, L, L, L2
As shown in table 2, if there is only one broadcaster, that broad-
caster will air L1 and garner all 210 viewers of that type. A second com-
petitive broadcaster will also air L, because the second broadcaster can
get 105 viewers (one-half of 210), which is better than the 75 viewers that
one could get from airing L2. A third competitor will air L2 because a
third channel of L, would get only 70 viewers, whereas L2 gets 75. But a
fourth competitor would choose to show L, because 70 viewers is more
than it could get with any other choice.
TABLE 3
PROGRAMS OFFERED BY A MONOPOLIST
1 L- - -
Number of 2 L, L2
Channels 3 L, L 2 L 3
4 L, L 2 L 3 L4
In contrast, as shown in table 3, a monopolist that controlled all
channels would never choose to duplicate any programs. As long as the
advertising revenues from the least popular type of show (L4) were suffi-
cient to cover costs of production and exhibition, the monopolist would
utilize all available channels and show a diverse mix. The three types of
minority-interest programming, L2, L3, and L4, would gain much more
exposure in a monopolistic market than in a competitive market.
Steiner's article is crucial for two reasons. First, his method of for-
malizing models of broadcasting markets changed the way subsequent
scholars have looked at the industry. Second, his rather startling conclu-
sion that a monopolist can be expected to cater to minority tastes more
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than competitors both explained many viewers' sense of the overwhelm-
ing "sameness" of offerings on the network triopoly and challenged our
traditional reverence for competition.
b. Beebe's aricle: Steiner's insights were independently redis-
covered and slightly extended by Rothenberg in 1962" and then
extended further by Wiles in 1963.59 But the biggest advance on these
models was produced by Beebe in 1977.6o
i. Assumptions: Although many of Beebe's basic assump-
tions mirror those of Steiner, the assumptions about audience preferences
and behavior differ substantially. In particular, Beebe varies the degree
to which the distribution of preferences is skewed across program types
and also varies the extent to which audiences are willing to watch mass-
appeal programming if their favorite types are not available. Beebe's
model began with five program types and five groups of television view-
ers. Beebe made nine alternative assumptions about market demand,
derived by considering three alternatives about the number of viewers in
each of the groups together with three alternatives about program prefer-
ences within the groups.
TABLE 4
GROUP SIZE UNDER ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS
A. Highly Skewed B. Moderately Skewed C. Nearly Rectangular
Distribution Distribution Distribution
g 1 8,000 5,000 1,077
r 2 1,600 2,500 970
o 3 320 1,250 872
u 4 64 625 785
p 5 12 313 707
58. Rothenberg, Consumer Sovereignty and the Economics of TV Programming, 4 STUD. PUB.
COMM. 45 (1962).
59. Wiles, Pilkington and the Theory of Value, 73 ECON. J. 183 (1963).
60. Beebe, Institutional Structure and Program Choices in Television Markets, 91 Q.J. EcoN. 15
(1977).
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ORDINAL RANKING OF PROGRAM TYPES BY VIEWER GROUPS
1. Viewers 2. Viewers have 3. Viewers have a
watch only first unique lesser common lesser choice
choice choice (common denominator)
Viewer group Viewer group Viewer group
number number number
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
11 1 2 1 2 3 3 3
2 1 1 2 1 2
Programs 3 1 1 2 1 2
4 1 1 2 1 2
5 1 1 1
Table 4 fills in the details of Beebe's assumptions. His first
assumption about viewer preferences (that "viewers watch only first
choice") corresponds to Steiner's model. Beebe's second assumption
allows each viewer to have a second choice. For example, viewers in
group 5 prefer to view program type 5, but if no type 5 program is on,
they will be willing to view type 4. If neither program type 5 nor type 4
is available, viewers in group 5 will not watch. Viewers in group 1 are
willing to watch only type 1 programs. With Beebe's third assumption-
that there is a common denominator-all viewers will be willing to watch
type 1 programs. For viewers in group 1 this is the only type of program
they will be willing to watch. For members of all other groups, however,
type 1 programming represents an acceptable second or third choice.
Beebe's three alternative assumptions about the sizes of the viewer
groups, also listed in table 4, complete his assumptions about viewer
demand.
Beebe provides eight alternative characteristics of program supply.
First, he varies program costs, assuming that they are either high
(requiring an audience of at least 1,200 viewers to break even) or low
(requiring an audience of only 800 viewers to cover costs). Second,
Beebe allows channel capacity to be limited (three channels) or
unlimited. Third, he allows the broadcasting channels to be controlled
either by a monopolist or by a set of competitors. By considering (1)
high and low costs together with (2) limited and unlimited channel
capacity and (3) monopolistic and competitive control of broadcast
channels, Beebe provides eight characterizations of program supply.
The nine alternatives for market demand and eight alternative
characterizations of program supply create seventy-two different
economies to analyze. For each of these economies, Beebe calculates the
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61equilibrium program output with a computer program. Then, by
changing only one of the variables and observing the programming-
output changes that result, Beebe observes the effect of that particular
variable.
In Beebe's model a monopolist provides whatever will maximize
profits, given the other parameters of the economy, and does so by
wooing the largest total audience for the broadcasting system. Whatever
programming a monopolist provides is, by definition, the programming
output of the industry.
Calculating the programming output of a competitive industry is a
bit more complex. A competitor, like a monopolist, wishes to maximize
profits but does so by maximizing the size of the audience on the
competitor's own channels, given what other competitors offer. To
predict the simultaneous output of several competitors, Beebe postulates
that equilibrium exists where no competitor has an incentive to alter
program offerings so long as no one else changes programming.6 2
Competitive broadcasters will reach an equilibrium and, having done so,
will remain there. The programming output of the broadcasting industry
can then be calculated.
ii. Results: We will not review all of Beebe's results, for
they are not all of central importance to this Article's purposes. We will
discuss several of them, however, to understand how the broadcasting
industry produces minority-interest programming in Beebe's model.
61. Id. at 21.
62. Id. at 22.
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TABLE 5
Programs
Case Pref. Viewer No. of Offered by
Number Pattern Distrib. Channels Monopoly Competition
1 1 A 3 1,2 1,1,1
2 1 A 6 1,2 1,1,1,1,1,2
3 1 C 3 1,2,3 1,2,3
4 2 B 3 1,3 1,1,2
1-4, each with
75%
5 2 C 3 1,3,5 probability*
6 3 C 5 1 1,2,3,4,5**
* Here the solution is a cycle of program offerings (similar to the child's game
of scissors, rock, and paper), rather than a stable, pure strategy equilibrium.
** This case was not included in Beebe's chart.
Table 5 contains the results of five cases in Beebe's paper.63 Case 1
corresponds to Steiner's original result. If viewers watch nothing other
than their first choices and if the preference groups are highly skewed, as
opposed to distributed evenly, a monopolist will produce some minority-
interest programming, while competitors will tend to duplicate whatever
the largest group likes best. However, as we begin to diverge from the
two assumptions about market demand inherent in the Steiner paper,
Steiner's results begin to fail. Case 3 uses the same preference pattern as
Case 1 but assumes that the viewer groups are almost equally sized. In
this case the monopolist will program the maximally diverse offering, but
so will competitors. (Note that as long as each of the three competitors
believes that the others will continue to offer the equilibrium program-
ming, none will change its own offering.) Case 6 shows that competitive
programming can be much more diverse than monopolistic program-
ming. If viewers are all willing to watch common-denominator program-
ming and if viewer groups are of almost equal size, a monopolist will
provide nothing but common-denominator programming,64 while com-
petitors will offer a completely diverse lineup.
These examples show that there is an interaction between the vari-
ables of monopolistic versus competitive control of broadcasting chan-
nels and the distribution of viewer tastes. Monopolists produce more
minority-interest programming if viewers are unwilling to watch any-
thing but their first choices and if their first choices are highly skewed
63. Id. at 24 (table II).
64. This result was first noted by Wiles, supra note 59, at 187.
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toward one type of programming. But competitors produce much more
minority-interest programming if viewers are willing to watch common-
denominator programming and their first choices are fairly evenly
distributed.
Beebe calculates the programming output for all seventy-two alter-
native economies and finds several tendencies. First, the interaction
between competitive versus monopolistic control of the broadcasting
industry and the distribution of viewer tastes and preferences described
above persist as long as the number of channels is quite limited. Monop-
olists will produce common-denominator programming if viewers will
watch it, and competitors will duplicate the first preferences of large
groups (rather than produce minority-interest programming) if the distri-
bution of viewer preferences is skewed. However, if the number of chan-
nels is quite large, competitors will produce at least as much minority-
interest programming as the monopolist.
Second, consumers are never made worse off by the addition of
channel capacity.6" In particular, the amount of minority-interest pro-
gramming never contracts in response to an expansion of channel capac-
ity, and sometimes it increases.
Third, program costs, which Beebe includes in his model as a mini-
mum audience size needed for a program to break even, can drastically
change the analysis. If costs are high relative to the potential audience
for a program, neither a monopolist nor competitors will produce the
program. Both would rather leave channels vacant than produce the
minority-interest programming. In such cases, the observed duplication
of the first choices of large groups (by competitors) or common-denomi-
nator programming (by a monopolist) should not be taken as evidence
that viable but less profitable minority-interest programming is being
ignored.
iii. Missing links?: Are any of Beebe's results dependent on
crucial, unrealistic assumptions? One crucial assumption, explored
within the context of monopolistic competition models, is that viewers do
not pay directly for programming. The arrival of pay-per-view will make
such an assumption faulty. In addition, different audiences have different
demographic appeal, and this is not directly addressed in the Steiner
model. However, since a viewer with more demographic appeal (or "dis-
posable income") can be "counted" as more than one viewer, the model
works fine. Third, Beebe's results assume that advertising prices would
65. Beebe, supra note 60, at 30.
1991]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
be the same in both a monopolistic and a competitive environment.
However, a monopolist would likely restrict available advertising min-
utes so as to raise their price and the monopolist's profits. 6 This might
provide a direct benefit to some viewers, but how would it affect minor-
ity-interest programming? Depending on the elasticities of demand for
minority-interest programming and common-denominator program-
ming, a monopolist might find minority-interest programming more
profitable, less profitable, or unchanged when compared with common-
denominator programming under a competitive pricing system. In gen-
eral, nothing can be said about this effect.
2. Monopolistic Competition
In 1977 Spence and Owen introduced a monopolistic competition
model of broadcasting to evaluate the welfare consequences of a monop-
oly versus competition within a context of either advertiser-supported or
direct viewer-paid programming." Spence and Owen use a traditional
economic measure of welfare-the total of producer and consumer sur-
plus 6 -to evaluate the output of the broadcasting market. Although a
welfare analysis of the broadcasting market can be quite interesting in its
own right, for our purposes the positive description of the industry's out-
put is more important. For this reason we will first outline the basics of a
monopolistic competition model and then, given alternative assumptions,
summarize its predictions about the final program mix in the industry.
In its most general form Spence and Owen's monopolistic competi-
tion model posits that no firm's programming output can be duplicated
exactly by a competitor. However, competitors can broadcast program-
ming that consumers regard as imperfect substitutes. This shapes
66. This depends on the elasticity of demand for advertising time. The marginal cost of pro.
ducing ad time is virtually zero.
67. Spence & Owen, supra note 54.
The economic literature on product differentiation can be divided into two branches. See B.
EATON & R. LIPSEY, supra note 53. In the "address" branch, researchers assume that consumers
have ideal points within a space of characteristics of a product. Products are identified by their
location in the space of characteristics. For an example of empirical work on television shows that
attempts to locate them within a 48-dimensional characteristic space, see Bowman, Consumer Choice
and Television, 7 APPLIED ECON. 175 (1975). In the "nonaddress" branch, the researcher assumes a
finite number of goods and characterizes them by the degree to which the goods are regarded as
substitutes for one another. To get results, researchers frequently employ a symmetry assumption,
according to which all goods are equally good substitutes for one another. Spence and Owen work in
the "nonaddress" tradition.
68. Although this measure is traditional in economic studies of markets, it is not without a
great deal of controversy in philosophy and law. See Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HoesTRA L.
Rav. 485 (1980).
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demand for each firm's output. The better the substitutes for a station's
programming, the less market power the station has. Therefore, each
firm must decide what programming to produce, given the decisions of
the other stations.69 The decisions are shaped by whether viewers pay
directly for programming, as well as whether the industry is controlled
by a single monopolist or has a place for many monopolistic competitors.
After a great deal of mathematical grinding,70 Spence and Owen
uncover some biases in the broadcasting system. First, they consider
viewer-paid programming in a market of monopolistic competition. If
minority-taste programs have steep inverse demand functions-that is,
they are very highly desired by a small number of people and desired by a
greater number only at very low prices (if at all)-then there will be a
"bias" against producing minority-interest programming. However, we
must be careful to note that in this context Spence and Owen have a
special meaning for the word "bias." They mean that majority-interest
programs that produce little consumer surplus may be more profitable
than minority-interest programs that produce a great deal of consumer
surplus. Thus, from the standpoint of welfare economics, a monopolisti-
cally competitive industry may produce too few minority-interest pro-
grams. Spence and Owen describe only a tendency in the industry. They
do not compute exact industry output; nor do they suggest that there will
be no minority-interest programming. Spence and Owen then ask if
advertiser-supported television would suffer from the same sort of bias,
and they conclude that the bias against minority-interest programming
would be even worse than it was under pay-TV.
Second, Spence and Owen find that there will be a bias against costly
programs, again measured by the consumer and producer surplus
norm." Finally, they find that a monopolist, not surprisingly, will
restrict the number of shows so as to raise prices and reduce overall
welfare.72
69. In the Spence and Owen model, each firm chooses output under the assumption that other
firms' decisions will not react to its own choice.
70. The mathematics and exposition are rendered much clearer by R. Lence, Theories of Tele-
vision Program Selection: A Discussion of the Spence-Owen Model (Studies in Industry Economics,
Department of Economics, Stanford University Discussion Paper No. 94, 1978).
71. See id. at 30.
72. Spence & Owen, supra note 54, at 110. Much of the rest of their analysis consists of char-
acterizing industry equilibriums if all programs are equally good substitutes and then ranking the
welfare properties of these equilibriums. Because very little light is shed upon the question of minor-
ity programming and because of the somewhat controversial notion of total surplus as applied to
minority programming, we will not review the remainder of Spence and Owen's work in the text of
this Article.
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- The Spence and Owen analysis has been extended and modified in
only a few papers. Most of the results are aimed at a welfare analysis of
various market structures, however, rather than at the question of minor-
ity programming. 73 To the extent that the newer literature does address
questions of minority-interest programming, it tends to reach the same
conclusions proposed by the Steiner and Spence-Owen models. 4
3. Public Choice Models
a. Noam's model: Eli Noam has published a model that uses
techniques first developed in the literature on public choice, particularly
regarding voting behavior and candidates' platform choices.75 Noam
assumes that every program can be located on a one-dimensional scale
running from "low culture" to "high culture." (Although Noam does
not say so, I would guess that public broadcasting's Masterpiece Theatre
is high culture, while the Disney Channel's Mouseterpiece Theater is low
culture.) Each type of programming has a "pitch"-Noam's term for
the program's point on the culture dimension. Each viewer has a most
preferred pitch. If the viewer's favorite type of program is shown, the
viewer will watch. If the viewer's preferred type of program is not
shown, the viewer may or may not watch. The further the distance from
the viewer's most preferred pitch to the closest substitute shown, the less
likely the viewer is to watch.
73. See Wildman & Owen, Program Competition, Diversity, and Multichannel Bundling in the
New Video Industry, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOL-
OGY 244 (E. Noam ed. 1985), in which the authors analyze a video market in which each monopolis-
tic competitor can choose between advertiser support or direct viewer payments. If each viewer is
restricted to purchasing at most one channel, Wildman and Owen's results track those of Spence and
Owen. If viewers are allowed to purchase more than one service, however, the theoretical models
become intractable. Id. at 253-55.
Wildman and Owen also explore multichannel bundling, such as is done with "tiering" on most
cable television systems, and demonstrate that, depending on demand and cost parameters, bundling
may either enhance or inhibit economic efficiency. Id. at 255-58.
74. For example, Waterman analyzes the programming choices of a monopolist cable-televi-
sion operator who has control over production budgets and who faces either advertiser or pay sup-
port within a context of limited or unlimited channel capacity. Waterman, "Narrowcasting" on
Cable Television: A Program Choice Model, Annenberg School of Communications, University of
Southern California (Oct. 12, 1988). Waterman finds that, as the number of channels increases, the
audience fragments, and minority-interest programming finds its way onto the cable system. Boren-
stein finds that a system with a limited number of broadcast licenses will have a bias against minor-
ity-interest programming. Borenstein, On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Operating
Licenses, 103 QJ. ECON. 357 (1988). Borenstein shows that an auction mechanism will not neces-
sarily allocate licenses-including broadcasting licenses-to the most welfare-enhancing use. The
"lumpiness" of licenses causes bidders to consider the profit on inframarginal units, thereby leading
to economically inefficient choice of broadcast format. The bias will be against minority-interest
programming and for mass-appeal programming. Id.
75. Noam, A Public and Private-Choice Model of Broadcasting, 55 PUB. CHOICE 163 (1987).
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Noam assumes that viewer tastes are distributed normally.76 He
then analyzes the programming choices of broadcasters under conditions
of monopoly and competition, single and numerous channels, and private
and public control.
Noam first shows that, if there is only one broadcast channel with a
private, profit-maxhimizing monopolist in control and if all portions of the
audience are equally valued by the advertisers, the monopolist will pro-
gram so as to maximize its audience-achieved by choosing the pitch
equal to the midpoint of the normal distribution. If viewers who prefer
high culture programs have more income and are therefore more desired
by advertisers, the monopolist will shade its program choice toward high
culture.
Noam then shows that if the government controls the broadcasting
station, it will program so as to achieve its own goals. If the nature of
programming were an election issue, rival parties would promise pro-
gramming so as to woo voters. Assuming that the distribution of voters
and viewers is identical, a two-party system would converge upon cen-
trist programming." Noam also investigates the use of a government
broadcasting monopoly for spoils purposes and for propaganda, but
Noam's most important analysis for our purposes involves multichannel
television.
Noam's conclusions are generally consistent with those of the Beebe
and Spence-Owen models. Most crucial is that numerous competitors
will have an incentive to serve minority tastes: "As the number of sta-
tions increases, their spread across the distribution widens, i.e., more
'outlying' program tastes are reached. At the same time, the spacing
between the chosen program pitches decreases, and viewers find closer
substitutes for their favored program pitches."7 " However, Noam also
concludes that a duopoly will not converge to common programming-but
rather will differentiate programs. This is a direct result of Noam's
assumptions about viewer preferences-that as the distance from a favor-
ite program pitch to the closest offered program grows, the probability of
viewing declines-and about the shape of the distribution of viewer
tastes. Noam's analysis includes some of the same logic as Beebe's first
preference pattern, where viewers are willing to watch only their first
76. Noam claims "the use of a distribution other than the normal would alter not so much the
basic analysis as the computations." Id. at 165. But, as Garber shows, changing the distribution
would change Noam's results. Garber, The Economics and Political Economy of Broadcasting: Chal-
lenges in Developing an Analytic Foundation, 55 PUB. CHOICE 189 (1987).
77. Noam, supra note 75, at 169.
78. Id. at 175.
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choice and have a nearly rectangular preference distribution. With these
preferences, Beebe found that competitors differentiated themselves.
Noam also finds that many competing stations are required before those
whose tastes lie at the extremes will be served. (The success of the Gong
Show may prove that those at the low culture end of the spectrum have a
chance at being served by commercial broadcasters.) Noam says that
this provides a rationale for having a government-controlled channel pro-
duce some minority-interest programming. If the government does pro-
duce minority-interest programming, however, commercial broadcasters
will have much less incentive to produce such minority-interest broad-
casting material on their own. 9
b. Cox's models of candidate platform competition: Gary Cox
has analyzed the strategies of politicians who attempt to maximize their
share of the vote through choices of positions on a one-dimensional (lib-
eral-conservative) scale.8 ° Cox has shown that if voters have ideal posi-
tions on the issue dimension and will vote for candidates whose positions
are closer to rather than further from their own, then as long as there are
at least three candidates, not all candidates will take the same position on
the issues. 8 In addition, if there are m candidates, at least one of the
candidates will choose a position such that at least (m -1/m) of the voters
are to the left, and another candidate will choose a position such that at
least (m - 1/m) of the voters are to the right.8 2 In other words, not all
candidates will be centrist, and the more candidates there are in the race,
the more extreme some of them will be.83
79. Garber provides a compelling criticism of Noam's approach and techniques. Garber, supra
note 76. Whether or not Garber is right (and I believe that he is), for our purposes the important
point is that Noam's conclusions seem consistent with those of Beebe and Spence-Owen,
80. G. Cox, Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems (Department of Polit-
ical Science, University of California, San Diego, Working Paper, 1989). See also Cox, Electoral
Equilibrium Under Alternative Voting Institutions, 31 AM. J. POL. SI. 82, 89 (1987).
81. See G. Cox, supra note 80, at 21-23 (theorem 4).
82. If, that is, a Nash equilibrium exists.
83. Cox's results described in the text apply to the case where each voter has only one vote and
the competitors are political parties under a proportional representation system. Two points should
be made about the applicability of this model to the broadcast market. First, as Gary Cox pointed
out to me in conversation, viewers may divide up their viewing day among several stations and hence
could be thought to have more than one vote-perhaps one vote per half hour-but may abstain
from voting (turn off the set) or accumulate their votes (by watching the same station during several
periods). If this is a more appropriate characterization of the broadcasting market, Cox's results are
modified in the following way. Assume each voter has v votes. Then as long as there are more than
2v competing political parties, any equilibrium will be dispersed in the sense that the party furthest
left must be positioned at or to the left of the ideal position of the (v/m)th most conservative voter,
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Cox's results also have meaning for the broadcasting market. If
broadcast programming can be characterized as having a position on a
one-dimensional space (as in Noam's work) and if viewers will watch the
programming closest to their ideal program, then Cox's model describes
the behavior of audience-maximizing broadcasters. As long as there are
three broadcasters in a market, they will not all broadcast the same types
of programming. Furthermore, if there are m broadcasters, at least one
of them will program such that at least (m -1/m) of the viewers are to the
left, and another will program such that at least (m -1/m) of the viewers
are to the right. The more broadcasters there are, the more "extreme"
some of them will be. Put differently, adding more broadcasters to a
market will increase service to the "minority" audiences, those with pref-
erences at the endpoints of the dimension.
4. Pulling the Theories Together
In general, the theoretical works discussed above agree on the cir-
cumstances under which profit-maximizing broadcasters will provide
minority-interest programming. If viewers are unwilling to watch any-
thing but first choices, their first choices are highly skewed, and the
number of channels is quite limited, then a monopolist will produce more
minority-interest programming than will competitors. On the other
hand, if viewers are willing to watch mass-appeal programming and if
first choices are almost evenly distributed, competitors will provide much
more minority-interest programming. This result holds regardless of
whether the number of channels are limited or not. If the number of
channels is extremely large, competitors will tend to provide at least as
much minority-interest programming as a monopolist would. Intermedi-
ate cases produce intermediate results.
Later in this Article, I will ask how, if at all, the race, ethnic origin,
or sex of a broadcast station owner might be expected to alter the basic
theory of producing minority-interest programming. But before I do
that, I will review some empirical work that seeks to test the basic theory
of program selection. After all, if the basic theory were to fail to predict
and the party furthest right must be positioned at or to the right of the ideal position of the (m-v/
m)th most conservative voter. G. Cox, supra note 80, at 21-23.
Second, in a proportional representation system, a competing party must garner at least some
threshold percentage of the votes to gain representation in the legislature. For example, in a legisla-
ture with 50 seats, a party would need at least 2% of the vote. In broadcasting, however, a station
with only 1% of the listening public gets to "keep" its audience. Cox notes that "it can be shown
that formulas with lower thresholds of exclusion will promote greater dispersion (at least in models
allowing... global spatial mobility)." Id. at 22.
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basic observations, there would be much less warrant for relying upon
that theory in later discussions.
B. DATA TESTING THE BASIC THEORY
Rogers and Woodbury8 4 provided a statistical test to evaluate
whether an increase in the number of radio stations in a market produced
an increase in the number of formats. Rogers and Woodbury used the
number of formats as the dependent variable 5 and used market popula-
tion, median household income, and some other demographic character-
istics as the independent variables. To get some measure of the
dispersion of tastes in the population-a variable Beebe's analysis sug-
gests is crucial-Rogers and Woodbury used percentage of the market
population over age thirty-four, percentage of blacks, and percentage of
Hispanics. The results tended to confirm the basic theory of program-
ruing choice. The coefficients of the number of stations in the market and
the coefficients of the measures of black and Hispanic populations were
all positive and significant. Only the percentage of the population over
thirty-four, which would seem less connected to taste dispersion than the
black and Hispanic variables, and the income measure, which would
seem poorly tied into the basic theory in the first place, were
insignificant.
Waterman and Grant86 assembled data from a sample of sixteen full
days of programming on forty nationally distributed cable and broadcast
networks between January 1 and June 30, 1986. Waterman and Grant
included twenty-six basic cable networks,87 eleven premium channels,88
and three broadcast networks.8 9 They coded all programming by subject
84. R. Rogers & J. Woodbury, The Conflict Between Spectrum Efficiency and Economic Effi-
ciency: Diversity Considerations in the Flexible Use of Spectrum Allocated to Radio (Federal Trade
Commission Working Paper, 1988).
85. Formats were easy listening, rock, big band, black, classical, ethnic (mostly Hispanic),
religious, classical, news/talk, jazz, country, and other. Id. at 8.
86. D. Waterman & A. Grant, "Narrowcasting" on Cable Television: An Empirical Assess-
ment (Annenberg School of Communications, University of Southern California Working Paper,
1989).
87. Arts & Entertainment Network, Black Entertainment Television, Christian Broadcasting
Network, Cable News Network, C-SPAN, Discovery, ESPN, Eternal Word Television, Financial
News Network, Headline News, Home Shopping Network, the Learning Channel, Lifetime, MTV,
the Nashville Network, National Jewish Television, Nickelodeon, the Silent Network, Spanish Inter-
national Network, Tempo, USA, VH-l, the Weather Channel, WGN, WOR, WTBS.
88. American Movie Classics, Bravo, Cinemax, Disney Channel, Galavision, Home Box Office,
Home Theater Network, the Movie Channel, Nostalgia Channel, the Playboy Channel, Showtime.
89. CBS, NBC, and ABC.
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matter,90 origin,9 1 and format92 and then obtained Neilsen ratings for
nineteen networks on which ratings were available. Waterman and
Grant found that cable networks offered a huge increase in the number
and diversity of offerings over those available on the three broadcast net-
works. The increase included offerings in such categories as "classical/
ethnic music or dance" and "foreign language"-categories in which
ABC, NBC, and CBS offered nothing.9 3 The authors concluded that the
expansion of channel capacity in cable television produced a substantial
amount of new diversity in programming. This supports the basic model
of minority-interest programming developed above.
C. PUTTING THE RACE AND SEX OF THE OWNER OF BROADCAST
STATIONS INTO THE MODEL OF MINORITY-INTEREST
PROGRAMMING
This section will ask how the race and sex of the broadcasting sta-
tion owner might be included in the programming models discussed
above. I will review the three most obvious possibilities. First, race and
sex might be irrelevant. Second, minority or female owners of stations
might engage in some consumption through choice of programming that
does not maximize profits. Third, minority or female owners might have
cost advantages (vis-a-vis white males) in broadcasting minority-interest
programming.
1. Race and Sex Might Be Irrelevant to Programming Decisions of
Owners
It is possible that all owners, regardless of race or sex, are motivated
by the desire for profit. Further, talent and cost-effectiveness at broad-
casting different formats might be randomly distributed across races and
sexes. If these statements are true, the models used above would not be
altered at all, and any empirical investigation, after controlling for all
other factors (such as number of stations in a market), would find that
formats should be distributed randomly across races and sexes.
In fact, it is even possible that the null hypothesis is correct but that
we will find that minority owners program for minority audiences more
frequently than do white males. The models of programming choice
described above showed that as the number of outlets increased, minority
90. E.g., children's, public affairs.
91. E.g., first run.
92. E.g., informational, dramatic.
93. D. Waterman & A. Grant, supra note 86, table 2.
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programming tended to become more and more profitable for broadcast-
ers. We shall find that the FCC's policies, which are designed to increase
the number of stations, may have spurred more minority programming.
94
The FCC, using its minority preferences in comparative hearings, may
have given a large number of the new broadcasting stations to minori-
ties.95 These new owners may have found that minority programming
was the most profitable broadcasting format to choose. Hence, we might
find new broadcasting owners, themselves racial or ethnic minorities,
choosing to program for minority audiences even though the new owners
desire only profits and have no cost advantage in programming for
minority groups.
2. Race and Sex Might Be Important Because of Consumption
Behavior
Female or minority station owners might be motivated by consump-
tion as well as profit maximization. This might be because the owner
desires to see programming of personal appeal on the air, or it might be
that the owner feels "solidarity" with the owner's group. Women might
feel that they owe it to their oppressed sisters to broadcast female-ori-
ented material, regardless of whether or not some profits must be sacri-
ficed. Black, Hispanic, and other minority owners might have similar
feelings about broadcasting for their respective minority groups. But
whatever the source of these feelings, such owners might be willing to
sacrifice profits to present minority-interest programming.96
How would such an insight affect the models discussed above? We
will work with a modification of Beebe's paper, mainly because it is most
94. See infra p. 327 (insight 4).
95. In addition, the FCC's professed preference for "local ownership" may have concentrated
black and Hispanic ownership in communities with large black and Hispanic audiences. As a result,
for purely profit-oriented reasons, black owners may program for minority audiences more than the
average white owner does.
96. Obviously, I am discounting any false-consciousness, "identification with oppressor" argu-
ment that would cut in the opposite direction.
The consumption argument is related to, but distinct from, the recent claim that nonwhites and
women speak with a different "voice." The claim about "voice" is, at core, an argument that minori-
ties and women experience life in different ways than do white men and that these different exper-
iences manifest themselves in a different set of perceptions and, perhaps, normative descriptions of
reality. See, eg., Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 561 (1984) (making the incendiary suggestion that liberal white law professors
should stop writing about civil rights so as to make room for minorities); Matsuda, Affirmative
Action and Legal Knowledge" Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(1988) (giving examples of how minority status might make a difference). See also D. BELL, AND
WE ARE NOT SAVED 140-61 (1987); Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial
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easily adapted to demonstrate the probable changes. Within Beebe's
model, we will designate a minority owner as "M" and assume that M
will choose to program minority-taste programming (that which is the
first choice of the smallest group) as long as the practice garners an audi-
ence size that is at least within X viewers of M's next-best alternative. To
understand this approach, we will work through several examples that
rely on table 6 below, which is a slight modification of the scheme in
Beebe's article.
TABLE 6
GROUP SIZE UNDER ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS
A. Highly Skewed B. Moderately Skewed C. Nearly Rectangular
Distribution Distribution Distribution
8,000
1,600
320
5,000
2,500
1,250
1,077
970
872
785
707
ORDINAL RANKING OF PROGRAM TYPES BY VIEWER GROUPS
1
2
Programs 3
4
5
In the
competitive
equilibrium,
1. Viewers
watch only first
choice
Viewer group
number
1 2 34 5
1
1
2. Viewers have
unique lesser
choice
Viewer group
number
1 2345
12
12
12
12
1
3. Viewers have a
common lesser choice
(common denominator)
Viewer group
number
1 23 45
1 2 2 2 2
1
following examples, we will assume that there are three
broadcasters. First we will compute the expected
given assumptions about the size of viewer groups and the
Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1979); Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of Color
in Still White Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 385 (1986).
For a critical review of this literature, see Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1855 (1990); Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinc-
tiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864 (1990); Brewer, Introduction: Choos-
ing Sides In the Racial Critiques Debate, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1844 (1990); Delgado, Mindset and
Metaphor, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1872 (1990) Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal
Academia, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1878 (1990); Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102
HARV. L. REv. 1745 (1989).
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configuration of viewer preferences. Then we will ask how the analysis
might change if one of the broadcasters were a minority-group member.
Example IA: Viewers watch only their first choice, and viewer
groups are highly skewed.
If we have viewer-preference pattern 1 with group distribution A
and there are three channels, each run by a profit-maximizing
competitor, the competitors will produce program type 1 on three
different channels and split 8,000 viewers three ways (2,666 viewers
each). Now let us assume that one of the broadcasters is M, who by
definition comes from the smallest group, group 5. M has a desire to
show programming that appeals to M's group. If M does so, however, M
will get only 12 viewers, a drop of 2,654 viewers. Only if M has an
extremely intense preference for this sort of consumption will M show
type 5 programming. If M does show type 5 programming, the
remaining two broadcasters will get 4,000 viewers each by showing
programming type 1.
Example 1B: Viewers watch only their first choice, and viewer
groups are moderately skewed.
If we have viewer-preference pattern 1 with group distribution B,
the three competitors will show two versions of programming type 1 and
one version of programming type 2. Each broadcaster will get 2,500
viewers. Now, if M is one of the broadcasters, M must be willing to get
only 313 viewers instead of 2,500, a drop of 2,187 viewers, to broadcast
programming type 5. If M were to show type 5 programming, either the
remaining two profit-maximizing broadcasters would both show
programming type 1, producing 2,500 viewers each, or one broadcaster
would show type 1 and the other would show type 2 programming,
producing 5,000 and 2,500 viewers, respectively. 97
Example C: Viewers watch only their first choice, and viewer
groups are distributed nearly rectangularly.
If we have viewer-preference pattern 1 with group distribution C,
the three competitors will show one version each of programming types
1, 2, and 3. The broadcasters will get 1,077, 970, and 872 viewers,
respectively. If M is one of the broadcasters, M's decision to show
97. The broadcaster who might show type 2 programming would be indifferent to doing so or
showing type 1, for both strategies produce 2,500 viewers. The broadcaster who shows type 1
programming can do no better, regardless of what the other broadcaster decides to do. The expected
audience size would therefore be (5,000 + 2,500 + 2,500 + 2,500)/4 = 3,167 for each, assuming
that the two outcomes were equally probable.
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programming type 5 will get only 707 viewers. The number of viewers M
would have to give up depends, of course, on whether M would show
programming type 1, 2, or 3 if M were to forgo showing type 5. If we
assume that the three alternatives are equally probable, we can calculate
M's expected audience from forgoing type 5 as (1,077 + 970 + 872)/3
= 973. Hence, M would need to give up 266 viewers (973 - 707) to
show type 5 programming. If M were to show program type 5, the
remaining two profit maximizers would show types 1 and 2 and would
get 1,077 and 970 viewers.
These three examples illustrate how the minority status of owners is
included within the model. The examples also produce an important
insight:
Insight 1: As the distribution of viewer tastes becomes more
rectangular, minority owners need to sacrifice less to satisfy a taste for
broadcasting minority programming.
In example 1A, M had to sacrifice 2,654 viewers (26.5% of the total)
to show type 5 programming. In example 1B, M had to give up 2,187
viewers (22.6% of the total) to show type 5 programming. And in
example 1C, M had to give up 266 viewers (6.0% of the total). Clearly,
the "cost" of showing type 5 programming falls as the distribution
becomes more rectangular. This means that, for example, it will be far
less costly for a black owner to broadcast black-oriented material in areas
with substantial black populations, such as Los Angeles and New York,
than in areas with relatively fewer blacks, such as Phoenix or Salt Lake
City.
Example 2A: Viewers have unique second choices, and viewer
groups are highly skewed.
If we have viewer-preference pattern 2 with group distribution A,
the three competitive programmers will show three versions of type 1
programming and get 3,200 viewers each. (Recall that viewers in group
2 will watch type 1 programming if no type 2 programming is available.)
If M is one of the broadcasters, M will have to give up 3,188 viewers
(3,200 - 12) to satisfy a preference for showing type 5 programming. If
M were to do so, the remaining two profit-maximizing broadcasters
would each show type 1 programming and get 4,800 viewers.
Example 2B: Viewers have unique second choices, and viewer
groups are moderately skewed.
If we have viewer-preference pattern 2 with group distribution B,
the three competitors will show two versions of type 1 programming,
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getting 2,500 viewers each, and one version of type 2 programming,
getting 3,750 viewers. The expected audience size is therefore (2,500 +
2,500 + 3,750)/3 = 2,917 viewers. If M is one of the broadcasters, M
must give up 2,604 viewers (2,917 - 313) to show type 5 programming.
If M were to do so, the remaining two broadcasters would show one
version of type 1 and one version of type 2 programming, garnering 5,000
and 3,750 viewers, respectively.
Example 2C: Viewers have unique second choices, and viewer
groups are distributed nearly rectangularly.
If we have viewer-preference pattern 2 with group distribution C,
the three competitors will engage in a cycle, showing each of
programming types 1, 2, 3, and 4 seventy-five percent of the time. The
cycle will be (1,2,3) -> (2,3,4) --+ (1,3,4) --* (1,2,3).98 This gives an
average of 926 viewers per broadcaster. If M is one of the broadcasters,
M must give up 219 viewers (926 - 707) to show type 5 programming.
If M were to do so, the remaining cycle would be (1,2) -+ (2,3) --- (1,3)
(1,2), producing an average of 973 viewers for each of the two
remaining broadcasters.
Example 3A: Viewers have a common-denominator choice, and
viewer groups are highly skewed.
If we have viewer-preference pattern 3 with group distribution A,
the three competitors will show three versions of type 1 programming,
attracting 3,332 viewers to each channel. If M is one of the broadcasters,
M must give up 3,320 viewers (3,332 - 12) to show type 5
programming. If M were to do so, the remaining two broadcasters
would both show versions of type 1 programming and get 4,992 viewers
apiece. -
Example 3B: Viewers have a common-denominator choice, and
viewer groups are moderately skewed.
If we have viewer-preference pattern 3 with group distribution B,
the three competitors will show three versions of type 1 programming,
getting 3,229 viewers each. If M is one of the broadcasters, M must give
up 2,916 viewers (3,229 - 313) to show type 5 programming. If M were
98. To see how this works, assume that the three competitors are showing types 1, 2, and 3 to
start with. If this is true, the broadcaster who is showing type I can improve viewership by showing
type 4, which gets 785 + 707 = 1,492 viewers, which is much better than the 1,077 viewers that
broadcaster got for showing type 1. Once that broadcaster makes the switch, the three broadcasters
are showing 2, 3, and 4. But in this case the broadcaster showing type 2 can do better by showing
type 1, for that gets everyone in group 1 and in group 2. Once that broadcaster makes the switch,
the three broadcasters are showing 1, 3, and 4. And so on.
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to do so, the remaining two broadcasters would each show type 1
programming and get 4,687.5 viewers.
Example 3C. Viewers have a common-denominator choice, and
viewer groups are distributed nearly rectangularly.99
If we have viewer-preference pattern 3 with group distribution C,
the three competitors will show three versions of type 1 programming
and get 1,470.3 viewers each. If M is one of the broadcasters, M must
give up 763.3 viewers (1,470.3 - 707) to show type 5 programming. If
M were to do so, the remaining two broadcasters would each show type 1
programming and get 1,852 viewers.
Table 7 reveals the pattern that emerges.
TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL AUDIENCE THAT MUST BE GIVEN
UP BY M TO SHOW TYPE 5 PROGRAMMING
Viewer Preference Pattern
1 2 3
A 26.5 31.9 33.2
Viewer Group Dist. B 22.6 26.9 30.1
C 6.0 5.0 17.3
Table 7 clearly supports insight 1; as viewers are more nearly rectan-
gularly distributed, the cost of serving minorities falls. This remains true
regardless of the viewer-preference pattern. But table 7 also provides
some support for another insight.
Insight 2: Serving minority groups becomes more costly if viewers
are willing to watch common-denominator programming. The figures in
column 3 provide support for this proposition. The reason for this is
quite intuitive. If viewers are all willing to watch common-denominator
programming, M is forced to forgo viewers from all other groups by
choosing to show type 5 programming.
Now consider what would happen if one of the two remaining
broadcasting licenses in each market were given to a second minority-
group member (M2). Table 8 gives the percentage of the viewership
market that M2 would have to give up to satisfy a taste for showing type
99. Using the original assumptions about preference distribution from Beebe's article
complicates the programming solution but does not change average viewership levels. In case 3C,
for example, the solution would be a cycle, (1,2,3) - (1,4,3) - (1,4,2) -- (1,3,2).
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5 programming, on the assumption that M has already decided to show
type 5 programming.
TABLE 8
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL AUDIENCE THAT MUST BE GIVEN
Up BY M2 TO SHOW TYPE 5 PROGRAMMING IF
M Is ALREADY SHOWING TYPE 5
Viewer Preference Pattern
1 2 3
A 40.0 48.0 49.9
Viewer Group Dist. B 31.1 43.5 46.8
C 15.2 14.0 34.0
Note that, in every type of market, M2 must give up more, usually
much more, to provide a second source of type 5 programming. This is
due to two factors. First, M2 must forgo a share of the increased audi-
ences that watch the remaining profit-maximizing broadcasters. Second,
M2 must share group 5 with M.
Even if M2 were to decide to pay this cost, it is by no means clear
that two versions of type 5 programming would be broadcast. Once M2
began broadcasting type 5 programming, M would also pay the 'rices"
listed for M2. M's share of group 5 would be cut in half by M2's actions,
and if M were to choose the pure profit-maximizing strategy, M could get
the big audiences that two profit maximizers would split. Hence, once
M2 broadcasts type 5 programming, M may choose to broadcast profit-
maximizing material.
Insight 3: Adding a second minority broadcaster to a market is less
likely to produce a second source of minority programming than adding
the first minority broadcaster was likely to produce a first source of
minority programming.
Other examples, in which we alter the number of broadcasting chan-
nels, provide further insights into the programming choices of a minority
broadcaster in a competitive market.I°°
100. I will not discuss examples with monopoly in them for two reasons. First, there is no
reasonable likelihood that the U.S. broadcasting system will be reorganized as a monopoly. Second,
if a monopoly were to gain control of U.S. broadcasting, I strongly suspect it would be run by upper-
class white males who would have no interest in presenting minority-interest programming, except
insofar as broadcasts of PGA tournaments count as minority programs.
However, I should point out that if a monopolist interested in presenting minority-interest pro-
gramming were to gain control, the monopolist could often satisfy its tastes at lower cost than a
competitor could. For example, in case 3C, a monopolist could show type 5 programming at no cost
to itself at all, whereas a competitor would have to give up a great deal.
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Example 4: Viewers will watch only their first choices, and viewers
are distributed nearly rectangularly.
If we have viewer preference pattern 1 with group distribution C but
there are four channels run by four competitive broadcasters, the com-
petitors will show programming types 1, 2, 3, and 4. If we then were to
add a fifth channel and a fifth broadcaster, the fifth broadcaster would
show type 5 programming. If the fifth broadcaster happened to be M, we
would observe M choosing to show type 5 programming.
In example 4, the expansion of channel capacity makes it profitable
to show minority-interest programming. M's decision to do so, however,
reveals nothing about M's motivation. M might be a profit maximizer,
and M's decision to show type 5 programming might be nothing more
than good business judgment.
Insight 4: Observing that new channels in a market are allocated to
minorities who choose to program for minority audiences does not neces-
sarily support the presumption that minority broadcasters have a taste
for minority broadcasting.
Example 5: Viewers will watch only their first choices, and viewers
have a moderately skewed distribution.
Consider the situation where we have viewer preference pattern 1,
group distribution B, fifteen channels run by competitors, and broadcast-
ers must get at least 600 viewers to break even. Competitive broadcasters
will show eight versions of type 1 programming, four versions of type 2
programming, two versions of type 3 programming, and one version of
type 4 programming. Each broadcaster will draw 625 viewers. If M is
one of the broadcasters, M will have to sacrifice 312 viewers (625 - 313)
to show type 5 programming. This amounts to half of M's expected
audience but only 3.2% of the audience total. This is far less than the
22.6% of the market M would have to give up if there were only three
broadcasters.
Insight 5: Increasing the number of outlets reduces the cost to
minority broadcasters of satisfying a taste for serving minority
consumers.
Putting together insights 1 through 5, we can see that a policy of
awarding broadcasting licenses to minorities as a means of increasing
minority broadcasting is most likely to work when the market has a sub-
stantial minority population that is not currently served, despite the
existence of many outlets in the community. However, if we simultane-
ously increase the number of outlets in a community and give one or
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more of the new outlets to minority owners, we cannot know, a priori,
whether any new service to minorities is due to the increase in outlets or
to a taste for minority programming on the part of the new owners.
3. Race and Sex Might Be Important Because of Production-Cost
Advantages
This explanation suggests that minority-group members might tend
to program for members of their own group because minority owners
have lower costs of doing so than do white males. Because costs are less,
break-even audience sizes will be smaller, and a minority format that
looks like a money loser to a white male owner will appear profitable to a
minority owner.
When and why would this explanation be right? After all, a skeptic
might suggest, a white male owner can hire black, Hispanic, Asian, or
female program managers. These managers could program for minority
audiences, using whatever special virtues membership in the minority
group bestows on the manager to raise the station's ratings to the highest
possible level. Specially talented minority managers would be rewarded
with higher salaries by profit-maximizing white male owners. In sum,
being a minority owner will provide no advantage-or, at best, an advan-
tage equal to the cost of hiring a manager (less the owner's best alterna-
tive wage).
The skeptic's account is incomplete. There is substantial literature
in economics and law about the difficulties of monitoring an agent's per-
formance.101 Principals never know with certainty how well an agent is
performing and must make guesses about rewarding or punishing an
agent based upon the performance of the enterprise. Because the per-
formance of the enterprise depends upon many other factors, some of
which are random, the principal has a difficult task. Anything that
reduces the cost to the principal of evaluating the agent's performance
will give the principal a cost advantage in production.
I suggest that the production-cost explanation is strongest when
membership in a minority group gives a minority owner an advantage in
101. An excellent review of the entire area is Holmstrom & Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 61 (R. Schmalansce & R. Willig eds. 1989). Classics
in the field include Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. EcON. 74 (1979); Ross,
The Economic Theory ofAgency: The Principal's Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973); Simon, A
Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship, 19 EONOMETRICA 293 (1951). See also Tirole,
Hierarchies and Bureaucracies, 2 J. L. EON. & ORGANIZATION 181 (1986).
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monitoring the performance of a station manager. This explanation var-
ies in likelihood and in strength for different minority groups.1"2
a. Spanish language (and other non-English-language) broad-
casters: Consider the case of non-English-language stations, most of
which are Spanish-language stations. These stations broadcast to partic-
ular minority communities that are isolated from mainstream, majority
culture not only by customs and housing patterns but also by language.
A white male owner who presumably does not know the language and
who almost certainly does not live in the minority community or share in
emerging social customs, trends, and fads will be at a great disadvantage
in trying to judge the performance of a minority broadcast programmer.
The owner will not even be able to understand the content of his own
station. Even if he could, he would have no way of judging the quality of
his programmer's strategy for attracting large numbers of minority lis-
teners and viewers. After all, the programmer might be spending very
little mental effort on the task, choosing to program safe, boring, middle-
of-the-road fare, despite changes in the community that would enable a
different strategy to capture greater ratings. The white owner would
have no way of knowing whether or not this were true. In contrast, a
minority owner who presumably speaks the language and comes from
the community would suffer no such disadvantage.1"3
b. Black community broadcasting: Second, black owners who
broadcast for black communities probably have comparative advantages
similar to, but smaller than, those enjoyed by Hispanic owners who
broadcast in Spanish. American blacks tend to live in distinct areas and
102. Again, a skeptic might reply, the argument in text is irrelevant to justifying minority pref-
erences in broadcasting. All a production-cost advantage suggests is that white owners should sell
stations to minority purchasers, who will be able to realize the increased profits from lower costs.
Although the skeptic has a point, there are two replies that can be made. First, the minority prefer-
ences save on subsequent transaction costs. Second, there may be capital market imperfections that
make it too costly for minorities to borrow money to purchase stations on the basis of asserted cost
advantages. For an argument that capital market imperfections exist, see FEDERAL COMMUNICA-
TIONS COMM'N, MINORITY OWNERSHIP IN BROADCASTING 11-17 (1978); Honig, supra note 10, at
875-76. For a set of interview data indicating that black owners of radio stations believe that market
imperfections, particularly in finance, preclude blacks from purchasing broadcast properties, see
Current Topic, Are Minority Preferences Necessary? Another Look at the Radio Broadcasting Indus-
try, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 380 (1990) (authored by Akosua B. Evans).
103. This is not to say that the minority owner would be able to monitor the managers without
any cost. I am arguing only that minority owners from groups that speak languages other than
English are likely to have significantly lower costs of monitoring managers' performance. To the
extent that a white owner speaks Spanish and reads La Opinion, for example, the white owner will
suffer a much smaller comparative disadvantage.
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produce separate cultural trends."° "Rap music" is probably the most
obvious example within the last few years. Many American blacks also
speak a dialect of English that is significantly different from the English
spoken by white Americans.105 These factors will combine to give many
American blacks an advantage in monitoring the performance of a man-
ager who is programming for the black community. However, these
advantages will be smaller than those enjoyed by Hispanic owners
because black English is much closer to white English than is Spanish.
Moreover, many American blacks who have enough money to purchase
a broadcasting station will tend to come from middle- and upper-class
communities that share much more with white America than they do
with the lower-middle- and lower-class black target audiences of black
programming.106 In addition, the tastes of black audiences for radio pro-
gramming have been moving toward the white mainstream to the extent
that black radio programmers have been forced to play songs by white
artists to lure black listeners.107
c. Female broadcasters: Women broadcasters who program
special material for other women present one of the most difficult cases.
Women as a group are much more diverse, numerous, and dispersed than
are the other groups discussed. For these reasons, exactly what women's
programming includes is much less clear. Perhaps programs geared to
the special biological concerns of women-menstruation, childbearing,
breast-feeding, menopause, and diseases of female organs-would be
included. Perhaps programs aimed at special social and economic con-
cerns of women would also be included. But these programs alone can-
not fill even a substantial portion of a radio or TV format. Some
104. For a review of literature confirming this, see Poindexter & Stroman, Blacks and Televi-
sion:L A Review of the Research Literature, 25 J. BROADCASTING 103, 110-13 (1981).
105. See J. DILLARD, LEXICON OF BLACK ENGLISH (1977); E. FOLB, RUNNIN' DOWN SOME
LINEs: THE LANGUAGE OF BLACK TEENAGERS (1980); G. SMITHERMAN, TALKIN AND TESTI-
FnyN: THE LANGUAGE OF BLACK AMERICA (1977). See also Martin Luther King, Jr. Elementary
School v. Ann Arbor School Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
106. Lower-middle- and lower-class blacks must be the target audience because there are so few
blacks in the middle and upper classes. In 1987, 7.5% of American black households earned
incomes of $50,000 or more, as compared with 19.7% of white households. STATISTICAL
ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 440 (1989).
107. Hunt, Black Radio Debates the Inclusion of White Artists, L.A. Times, Mar. 26, 1989,
Calendar, at 5. The article contains complaints by black radio programmers about the need to
program white artists into the schedule and laments the loss of genuine black radio formats. A
skeptic might interpret these complaints as the managers' unhappiness with the slightly reduced
value of their skills at programming for a specialized market. On the question of black-oriented
radio and its place in the market, see Grein, Motown on the Road to a Comeback, L.A. Times, July
30, 1989, Calendar, at 70; Hochman, Black Rock Coalition Pushes for an End to "Musical
Apartheid," L.A. Times, June 14, 1989, Calendar, at 1, col. 1.
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entertainment programming would also need to be included, but there is
very little that would seem to appeal only to women. The most likely
examples of network shows with strongly female audiences are Cagney
and Lacey and Kate and Alie,08 but these shows have also drawn very
large numbers of men.
A female owner, who is probably more acutely aware of the social
and economic discrimination historically suffered by women, might have
some advantage in monitoring the performance of a manager who is pro-
gramming for the female audience. But because women as a group speak
essentially the same language that men do and live in the same places, it
is unclear why any such monitoring advantage should be large."°
108. According to figures supplied by CBS, the ratings for the two shows were as follows:
CAGNEY & LACEY
WOMEN 18 +
Men 18 +
TV
SEASON RTG SH RTG (000) % Disr RTG (000) % Dmsr
1981-82 15.2 24 12.3 10,380 53.1 9.7 7,360 37.6
1982-83 15.2 24 11.3 9,780 52.0 9.0 6,980 37.1
1983-84 20.9 36 16.3 14,270 .55.7 12.0 9,460 36.9
1984-85 16.9 28 13.6 12,050 58.0 8.8 6,990 33.6
1985-86 16.7 27 13.6 12,160 57.9 8.6 6,960 33.2
1986-87 15.1 24 12.1 11,010 59.8 6.6 5,488 32.1
Source: NTI
KATE & ALLIE
WOMEN 18 +
MEN 18 +
TV
SEASON RTG SH RTG (000) % DSr . RTG (000) % Disn
1983-84 21.9 33 18.2 15,910 52.6 11.7 9,240 30.6
1983-85 18.3 27 14.9 13,220 52.4 9.3 7,400 29.3
1985-86 20.0 29 16.7 14,980 51.7 10.1 8,140 28.1
1986-87 18.3 27 15.9 14,480 53.4 8.9 7,290 26.9
1987-88 14.7 22 12.3 11,295 55.6 7.5 6,198 30.5
1988-89 13.1 20 10.8 10,113 56.8 6.8 5,715 32.1
Source: NTI
UNIVERSES
TV SEASON HOUSEHOLDS WOMEN 18+ MEN 18+
(000) (000) (000)
1981-82 81,500 84,720 76,140
1982-83 83,300 86,350 77,770
1983-84 83,800 87,480 78,870
1984-85 84,900 88,570 79,850
1985-86 85,900 89,560 80,800
1986-87 87,400 90,830 81,980
1987-88 88,600 91,900 82,980
1988-89 90,400 93,410 84,470
Source: NTI
109. This does not of course preclude the possibility that many women might have a strong taste
for broadcasting for other women.
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d. Modeling the cost advantage: How should we incorporate
an owner's cost advantage in monitoring managers into the models of
broadcast competition? A cost advantage plays exactly the same role as
a taste for broadcasting minority programming. The model in preceding
sections included a taste for minority programming, defined as the will-
ingness of an owner to give up a number of viewers to broadcast minority
programming. A profit-maximizing broadcaster who has a cost advan-
tage at broadcasting to minority audiences will be willing to give up
nonminority viewers to do so, other things being equal, if the lost adver-
tising revenues are less than the broadcaster's cost advantage. A large
cost advantage translates into a willingness to give up many viewers, just
as does a strong taste for minority programming. Thus the general les-
sons from the previous models should be applicable here.
A policy of awarding broadcast licenses to minorities and women so
as to increase programming targeted at these groups will be most effec-
tive in a market with substantial minority populations that are not cur-
rently served by any of the large number of outlets in that market. In
addition, to the extent that the policy depends upon cost advantages, it
will be most effective for owners from non-English-language minorities,
slightly less effective for black owners, and least effective for women
owners.
4. Potential Problems with the Models
Are these theoretical results of interest to a court that is testing the
minority preference policies, or are there serious problems that prevent
using the theories to analyze the policies? Several potential problems
suggest themselves:
a. Federal Communication Commission policies may affect the
choice ofprogramming by profit-maximizing broadcasters: Applicants for
broadcasting stations may believe that proposing to present minority pro-
gramming increases the chance of gaining the license. Similarly, incum-
bent broadcasters may well believe that presenting some minority
programming increases the chance of a smooth, low-cost renewal. In
fact, the FCC has gone so far as to suggest that every broadcasting sta-
tion must program some minority material. I" However, other FCC poli-
cies may have increased the cost of presenting minority programming.
110. See Network Programming Inquiry, supra note 6, at 7295 (requiring programming in 14
different categories, including programs for children, religious programs, educational programs, pub-
lic affairs, editorials, politics, agriculture, news, weather, sports, minority programming, local self-
expression, programs with local talent, and entertainment).
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For example, the FCC now claims that its administration of the fairness
doctrine raised the cost of presenting nonmainstream political views to
the public.'11
b. The models only attempt to predict "type" of service to
groups with minority tastes for broadcast programming: The models' defi-
nition of "minority" programming as that desired by a minority group
may fail to capture the subtle differences that might support the minority
preference policies. It may be that minority and female owners would
program the same types of material as white males but would do so in
slightly different ways. For example, there might be a subtle difference in
the slant with which the news is presented, so that interpretations of
events more congenial to minority or female interests are aired. Viewers
might be indifferent to the distinction (in terms of the decision about
whether or not to watch) but still might garner a somewhat different set
of views about the world from watching.1
2
c. The models neglect the influence of cable television and
other methods of delivering minority programming: One can always
purchase Spanish-language records and tapes, after all. To understand
how cable, records, and tapes would affect the analysis, hold the number
of viewers of type 1 through type 4 programming constant. Now sup-
pose that viewers of type 5 material do not regard commercial announce-
ments as a cost but are highly sensitive to the out-of-pocket costs of
purchasing cable, records, or tapes. In this case, if no one in the market
is showing type 5 material, a broadcaster could pick up all of the minor-
ity viewers by showing type 5 programming. On the other hand, if the
viewers of type 5 programming are sensitive to the implicit costs of com-
mercial announcements, some will choose to purchase commercial-free
material and remove themselves from the pool of viewers who prefer
broadcasted type 5 programming. Type 5 programming will then appear
less attractive to broadcasters. Therefore, the extent to which various
111. See Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station WTVH Syracuse,
New York, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043 (1987).
112. Two of the witnesses at the Senate hearings in September of 1989 urged arguments some-
thing like this upon the Subcommittee on Communications. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of
Percy E. Sutton); id. at 29-30 (statement of James L. Winston).
This should not be confused with the related argument that although women do not all think
alike about controversial issues, women are much more likely than men to agree that some issues are
important and deserve to be treated. See Leiby, supra note 46, at 406. This argument does suggest
that women owners will program very different material than will men.
1991]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
minority groups find other sources of minority programming both avail-
able and desirable affects the demand for broadcasted minority program-
ming and thus the programming choices of broadcasters.
Now, if we introduce cable, tape, and record alternatives to the anal-
ysis of type 1 through type 4 programming, we will need to determine
how many potential viewers are removed from these programming types
as compared with type 5 programming. Then we can determine whether
type 5 programming becomes more enhanced as a programming option
for broadcasters, relative to the nonminority choices. The analysis will
likely become quite complex.' 1 3
I suspect that the problems with these models are enough to cause
any social scientist to shudder at the idea of using them. However, in
this Article I am not trying to figure out whether the state of the art
would satisfy a social scientist, but rather whether a court might be will-
ing to use the theories and data to uphold a law under attack. For such a
purpose, these models of the effect of race and sex on an owner's pro-
gramming decisions may provide enough of a basis for a court to proceed
to examine the data.
D. DATA ON OWNERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS AND
BROADCASTING CONTENT
1. Early Data
The few sources of data on the relationship between ownership char-
acteristics and broadcast content suggest nothing inconsistent with the
model presented above. In an article published in 1978, Lawrence Soley
and George Hough II1114 ascertained that the number of black-owned
radio stations 1 5 had grown from twelve in 1970 to fifty-six in 1977.
They produced the following table, showing that the vast majority of
black-owned stations were purchased.
113. The analysis would likely depend upon the relative income levels of those in each of the
groups. My guess is that the lower the relative income of a listener or viewer group, the higher the
tolerance for commercial announcements and the more likely that group is to demand over-the-air
programming. Of course, the lower the income, the less desirable is the group as a target audience.
My guess is that blacks, one of the poorest ethnic groups in the United States, would tend to substi-
tute other media for commercial broadcast far less than would Asians, one of the richest ethnic
groups in the United States.
114. Soley & Hough, Black Ownership of Commercial Radio Stations: An Economic Evaluation,
22 J. BROADCASTING 455 (1978).
115. There was only one black-owned television station in the U.S. Id. at 458.
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TABLE 9116
METHOD OF ACQUISITION BY BLACK BROADCASTERS
Before 1970 70-71 72-73 74-75 76-77 Total
Purchase 2 1 13 15 8 39
Othera 10 2 0 1 4 17
' Includes new frequency assignments, bankruptcy acquisitions, and transfers
without compensation.
Soley and Hough reported that "[a]ll but two of the stations
acquired between 1972 and 1977 have had black-oriented formats, pro-
gramming primarily rhythm and blues, soul, jazz or gospel music."117
Thus, there was a significant connection between black ownership and
the broadcasting of black-oriented programming. This connection could
be consistent with either a "taste" for broadcasting for one's own group
or with a cost advantage at broadcasting for one's own group.
Soley and Hough also suggested that a disproportionate number of
black-owned stations were in the top fifty markets.11 These markets
tended to include large cities that had substantial black populations.
Recall that satisfying a taste for minority broadcasting or exploiting a
cost advantage in minority broadcasting is easier in a market with a sub-
stantial minority population. Thus, the location of the black-owned sta-
tions is also consistent with the model.
A 1981 article by Loy Singleton directly measured public-service
programming on black-oriented radio stations, as contrasted with other
radio stations, and found no difference.119 Singleton concluded that
granting more broadcasting stations to minority-group members would
not increase the amount of public-service programming to minorities.
His research, however, was so seriously flawed that no such conclusion
could be drawn. The best that can be said for Singleton's work is that it
is consistent with any hypothesis about the connection between owner-
ship characteristics and programming. 120
116. Id. at 459.
117. Id. at 461.
118. Id. at 460 (table II1), 462.
119. Singleton, FCC Minority Ownership Policy and Non-Entertainment Programming in Black-
Oriented Radio Stations, 25 J. BROADCASTING 195 (1981).
120. Singleton's most egregious error was his decision to locate all black-oriented radio stations,
determine the race of the owners, and then compare the actions of black and white owners who were
broadcasting for blacks. This is wildly inappropriate for an evaluation of a policy that first picks an
owner by race and then hopes for differential programming output. To understand this, just con-
sider that if black owners were far more likely than white owners to program for blacks, then even if
black and white owners who chose to program for blacks were to provide equal levels of public-service
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Another 1981 article, by Schement and Singleton, 121 measured pub-
lic-service programming by white and Hispanic owners of Spanish-lan-
guage radio stations and found no difference between the two. These
results are also consistent with any hypothesis about the connection
between ownership characteristics and programming.
22
programming, awarding a license to a black instead of a white, other things being equal, would tend
to provide more public-service programming to the black community. In effect, Singleton got the
causation element of the minority preference policies backward.
Singleton should have located all black owners and then asked how much community-service
programming the black owners provided to the black community, as compared with white owners.
Even this data might fail to have much value, however. The ability of black owners to choose the
locale of purchased stations might alter the analysis. After all, if black owners were to choose to
purchase stations in areas with large (relatively underserved) black populations, then maybe the
market demand, and not black owners' bountiful supply, would explain the tendency of blacks to
program for blacks. But this argument would make a difference only if black owners were to
purchase stations in areas with large black populations for reasons unrelated to the black owners'
lower costs of targeting a black audience or special desire to serve a black audience. For example, if
black owners were to purchase stations with an eye toward personally running the station and also
being able to frequently socialize with many black friends, the black owners' choice might dictate
location, and the location would dictate the target audience. In this way we might observe black
owners programming for black audiences far more often than nonblack owners, but no cost advan-
tage or desire to serve black audiences would be present. On the other hand, if black owners were to
purchase stations in areas with large black audiences so as to take advantage of lower costs or special
desires to serve black audiences, then the location would be the effect rather than the cause. It would
be hard to know, just from staring at the data, which scenario was correct.
121. Schement & Singleton, The Onus of Minority Ownership: FCC Policy and Spanish-Lan-
guage Radio, 31 J. COMM. 78 (1981).
122. Schement and Singleton use a research design similar to that used by Singleton, but they
avoid drawing inappropriate policy conclusions. Schement and Singleton suggest that it may be
inappropriate to expect Hispanic owners who choose to program in Spanish to provide significantly
more public-service programming than do white owners who program in Spanish.
There are also data in David Honig, Relationships Among EEO, Program Service, and Minor-
ity Ownership in Broadcast Regulation, in Proceedings from the Tenth Annual Telecommunications
Policy Research Conference 83 (Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Paul Espinosa & Janusz A. Ordover eds.
1983), that could be consistent with either the taste or the monitoring-cost-advantage hypothesis.
Honig finds that black-owned, black-oriented radio stations employed blacks in 72% of all high-level
job positions (officials, managers, professionals, technicians, salespersons), while white-owned, black-
oriented radio stations employed blacks in 43% of all high-level jobs. The industry averages for
blacks were "8.1 percent of professional and 9.3 percent of technician positions in broadcasting, but
only 4.3 percent of officials and managers and 4.6 percent of sales positions." Id. at 88. In addition,
Honig finds that stations with black program service hire twice as many blacks as stations with no
such service.
Obviously, as Honig points out, there are several possible causal explanations for his findings.
Two easy explanations involve taste (black owners prefer to hire blacks and to program for blacks)
and production cost (black owners can monitor the performance of black employees more cheaply,
particularly when programming for blacks).
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2. Congressional Research Service Study123
Recall from previous discussion that, when the D.C. Circuit
remanded the Steele case to the FCC, one of the central purposes of the
remand was to allow the FCC to develop data on the relationship
between ownership characteristics and programming content.124 To do
that, the FCC sent questionnaires to all radio and television licensees,
requesting data about the percentage of ownership interest in the license
by minority groups and women; about whether the distress sale, compar-
ative hearing preference for women and minorities, or tax certificate poli-
cies were "involved" when the station was acquired; about the format
(for radio); and (for all stations) about any programming specially
targeted at minorities, women, children, or senior citizens. 121 Seventy-
nine percent of all stations responded, but when Congress passed Joint
Resolution 395 at the end of 1987, the FCC had to terminate its
inquiry. 126 The Subcommittee on Telecommunications of the House
Committee on Commerce and Energy then directed the Congressional
Research Service ("CRS") to analyze the responses, and on June 29,
1988, the CRS released the results.
The CRS report first compares the rates at which white-male,
minority, and female broadcast station owners choose to program for
minorities, women, children, and senior citizens. The CRS lumped
together all broadcaster responses into one big pool rather than segregate
them by market. The CRS claims that it was forced to do so because the
FCC study elicited insufficient market identification and demographic
data to make segregation by market feasible and no alternative source of
123. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF FCC SURVEY DATA: MINORITY BROADCAST STATION OWNERSHIP AND MINORITY
BROADCASTING (1988) [hereinafter CRS]. Study of this quite current data set is crucial for the case
of black-oriented radio because of the upheavals in the market since the late 1970s. During that
period the disco craze took hold, and many white listeners were added to formerly all-black
audiences. When disco died, the urban contemporary ("U/C") format was created. U/C tends to
attract a multiethnic audience, with roughly similar numbers of black and white listeners. As a
result, the remaining audience for strictly black formats has been reduced. See M. KEITH, RADIO
PROGRAMMING: CONSULTANCY AND FORMATICS 165-66 (1987).
124. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
125. The questionnaire also asked about other things, such as degree of integration of ownership
into management. The items listed in the text are those of central importance to our inquiry,
however.
126. Perhaps I should say that the FCC chose to terminate the inquiry. There is a very strong
argument that Joint Resolution 395 was unconstitutional. See Sidak, The Recommendation Clause,
77 GEO. L.J. 2079 (1989).
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such information was available at low cost. 12 7 To make up for this defi-
ciency, the CRS chose five large markets 12 and five small ones,1 29 ran
the same comparisons of the programming choices of white-male and
other station owners within each market, and then compared the level of
minority programming to the percentage of minority population in each
market. This last comparison was ostensibly an attempt to ascertain to
what extent minority programming was "market driven" rather than
driven by ownership characteristics. 30
What follows is a partial summary of the masses of data presented in
the CRS report. However, for some of the general statements I will
make, there will be one or more specific counterexamples.
a. Aggregated data for all stations: The following chart sum-
marizes the CRS findings on the number of broadcasting stations in
which minorities hold broadcasting interests.
TABLE 10131
NUMBER (PERCENT) OF TOTAL STATIONS REPORTING
MINORITY OWNERSHIP
Less than 51% Ownership 51% or More Ownership
Black 496 (5.7%) 166 (1.9%)
Hispanic 209 (2.4%) 87 (1.0%)
Asian/Pacific 87 (1.0%) 16 (0.2%)
Indian/Alaskan 62 (0.7%) 39 (0.4%)
NUMBER (PERCENT) OF TOTAL STATIONS REPORTING FEMALE OWNERSHIP
Less than 51% Ownership 51% or More Ownership
3,091 (35.4%) 619 (7.1%)
Total = 8,720 stations reporting. 7,558 reported no minority owners.
Female ownership was not broken down by race.
Most of these figures for 51% or more ownership are consistent with
received wisdom, but the numbers for minority and especially female
ownership interest at 50% or less seem higher than most people in the
industry believe.
127. CRS, supra note 123, at 2-3.
128. The large markets were New York, N.Y.; Dallas, Tex.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Chicago, Ill.;
Atlanta, Ga. Id. at 3 n.1.
129. The five small markets were Flagstaff, Ariz.; Elmira, N.Y.; Meridian, Miss.; Butte, Mont.;
and LaCrosse, Wis. Id.
130. The CRS study cautions against leaning very hard on its conclusions precisely because it
has no firm handle on separating these effects. Id. at 3.
131. See id. at 9.
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The aggregated comparisons for ownership characteristics and pro-
gramming choices show several general trends. First, minority owners
are more likely to program for their own minority groups than other
owners are. For example, 79% of all stations owned (51% or more) by
blacks target black audiences. Only 20% of nonblack-owned stations
target black audiences. Second, minority owners (51% or more) are no
more likely to program for other ethnic groups than are nonethnic own-
ers. For example, consider the following table.
TABLE 11132
PERCENT OF STATIONS IN OWNERSHIP GROUPS (50%) BROADCASTING
BLACK PROGRAMMING
Nonblack Black Hispanic Asian/Pac Ind/Alask Women
20 79 8 13 13 25
The results for all ethnic groups are limited in table 12 below.
The results also suggest that women are somewhat more likely to
program for other women than are men but that women are not, in gen-
eral, much more likely to program for minorities.
132. See id. at 14.
The opposite trend in broadcasting to other ethnic groups is observed for stations with less than
51% minority ownership.
TABLE 13
PERCENT OF STATION IN (51%) OWNERSHIP GROUPS BROADCASTING BLACK PROGRAMMING
Nonblack Black Hispanic Asian/Pac Ind/Alask Women
20 60 46 28 39 26
Broadcasting stations with less than 51% black ownership are more likely to broadcast to other
ethnic groups. This sort of data is not particularly helpful for several reasons. First, there is no
breakdown according to how large a percentage these owners had or the nature of the other owners.
If many of the stations that had small percentages of black ownership also had less than 51% owner-
ship interests by other ethnics, this could explain some of these results. Second, the economic mod-
els I presented were constructed to explain the programming choices of minorities who controlled
the broadcasting stations-in effect, 51% or more owners. For these reasons, I will concentrate on
the data from the stations that are owned by minorities and women.
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TABLE 12133
PERCENT OF MEN AND WOMEN OWNERS BROADCASTING
MINORITY AND WOMEN'S PROGRAMMING
Target Groups for
Programming Men Women
Women 28 35
Black 19 25
Hispanic 10 10
Asian/Pacific 3 3
Indian/Alaskan 4 5
Which of the three hypotheses about minority and female broadcast
station owners-attributing no difference, difference according to minor-
ity taste, or difference according to cost advantage-is consistent with
these results?
i. "No difference" hypothesis: It is possible, but not very
likely, that the "no difference" hypothesis can be consistent with these
results. First, explanatory variables that have been left out of the model
might produce these statistical patterns. For example, it is possible that
minority and (to a lesser extent) female licensees have smaller, lower-
power stations than do white-male licensees. Small stations might be
much better suited to targeting minority and female audiences than large
stations, so the tendency for minority owners to program much more for
minorities might be explained, in part, by the size of the stations. How-
ever, such an explanation fails to account for why minority owners
should program so much more for their own groups and less for others.
Example 4, discussed previously,134 provides a second possible rec-
onciliation of the data and the "no difference" hypothesis. Example 4
showed that if the number of channels in a market increases, minority
broadcasting may become profitable for the first time. If the new channel
is allocated to a minority broadcaster, that broadcaster will choose to
broadcast minority-interest programming even though that broadcaster
is a pure profit maximizer who has no particular cost advantage or taste
preference. Could such a scenario have been played out in the American
broadcasting industry? Over a ten-year period beginning in 1977, the
number of commercial television stations grew from 711 to 986, AM
radio stations increased from 4,559 to 4,866, and FM stations climbed
133. See id. at 14-18.
134. See supra p. 327.
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from 4,117 to 5,208.135 This growth in the number of broadcast stations
occurred during a period when the minority preferences were in effect.
Perhaps many of the new stations were given to minorities who just hap-
pened to be in markets where minority-program broadcasting was ren-
dered the most profitable alternative by the grant.
Although such an explanation is possible, there are several good rea-
sons to be skeptical. First, this explanation relies on a coincidence of the
same scenario being played out in market after market. Second, it does
little to explain why minorities are broadcasting for their own groups so
much more than for other minority groups. This explanation suggests
that black broadcasters would program for Hispanics and other minori-
ties quite frequently, but the data does not bear this out. Last, the early
article by Soley and Hough 136 found that the vast majority of black
broadcasters bought their stations. If this trend continued, it would be
inconsistent with the "no difference" hypothesis. However, to truly rule
out this hypothesis, some market-by-market empirical work must be
done. But until that work is done, I will regard the "no difference"
hypothesis as unlikely.
ii. The "taste" hypothesis: Much of the CRS data is con-
sistent with the taste hypothesis developed earlier.137 Minority broad-
casters target their own groups far more frequently than others do. A
sense of group identification, a psychological need to communicate with
one's own community, a desire to teach one's own group, a sense of pride
in one s ethnic music and culture, and so on, could all explain why
minority owners prefer to target their own groups. I have no a priori
expectation of why female owners' taste for targeting women should be
weaker (or stronger, for that matter) than minority owners' taste for
targeting their own communities.
138
iii. The "monitoring cost advantage" hypothesis: The
CRS data tracks closely the predictions of the "monitoring-cost advan-
tage" explanation. Hispanic owners, who were predicted to have the
largest cost advantages, are 7.4 times more likely to target Hispanic audi-
ences than are non-Hispanic owners. Black owners, also predicted to
have significant but slightly smaller cost advantages, are almost 4 times
as likely to target black audiences as are nonblacks. Women, who were
135. See BROADCASTING TELEVISION & CABLE FACTBOOK A-13 (1987).
136. Soley & Hough, supra note 114.
137. See supra Part III, Section C(2).
138. I also have no a priori expectations as to whether white male owners would target white
males.
1991]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
predicted to have only slight cost advantages, are only 1.2 times as likely
to broadcast to women as are men. This theory did not predict that
minority or female owners would be more likely to target other groups,
and the data does not show that they are, in general. In sum, the "moni-
toring-cost advantage" hypothesis does a pretty good job of explaining
the data. 1
39
b. Data from five large and five small markets: The CRS ran
comparisons similar to those just described for all broadcasting stations
in five large and five small markets. The results for the large markets
were quite similar to the national results, but in the small markets there
were so few stations with minority owners that the comparisons were
rendered meaningless. 1" When the CRS compared the rate of minority-
program broadcasting in the large markets with the minority population
percentage in the market, it found that nonethnic owners tended to
broadcast for minorities at a rate equaling the minorities' percentage in
the population. Ethnic owners tended to target minority audiences at a
higher rate.1 41
c. The data might be worthless: One possibility is that these
results are consistent with everything because they are inherently unrelia-
ble. There is no definition of minority programming in the study, and all
data are self-reported by licensees. No attempt was made to cross-check
the reliability of the reported data. Indeed, any such cross-check would
have required a working definition of minority programming. Hence, it
is possible that the CRS study was picking up nothing more than differ-
ent perceptions of minority owners or different self-reporting rates of
minority owners.
139. The CRS study also looked at the type and quantity of minority-interest programming by
various owner groups. Was the programming regularly scheduled, or was it special programming?
Did the owner provide more than or less than 20 hours per week of minority-interest programming?
The statistical results conform to those described in the text. See CRS, supra note 123, at 27-36.
The CRS study also separately examined stations reporting that their owners participated in
management. CRS found that stations "with black, Hispanic and Asian/Pacific manager-owners
had a higher percentage programming for their own minority audience group and lower percentages
for other minority groups." Id. at 40. This is consistent with both the taste and monitoring-cost-
advantage hypotheses. An owner who managed a station might satisfy personal tastes more fre-
quently at lower cost. Similarly, an owner-manager would be in the best position to use a monitor-
ing-cost advantage, for he would have personal knowledge of the day-to-day operations.
140. The CRS study used data on stations with less than 51% minority ownership interests and
found large unexplained differences between national patterns and those found in small markets. Id.
at 44. This reinforces my decision to use only data from stations where minorities hold ownership
interests of greater than 50%.
141. Id. at 25.
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The CRS study's data on the most commonly used format by black
owners-jazz-partially reinforce these concerns. Jazz is definitely a
crossover format, like urban contemporary, favored by a large number of
black and white listeners. 142 Black owners who program jazz may regard
themselves as targeting a black audience, while white owners who pro-
gram jazz may have no such self-perception. Hispanic owners who pro-
gram jazz may have something else in mind.
142. Regarding urban contemporary, see M. KErrH, supra note 123, at 147.
Some sample radio demographics:
KGFJ
L.A. radio station classified as "black" by Arbitron.
Listeners' Demographics (as supplied by station)
Age: 25 - 54
Male/Female ratio - 50/50
Race percentiles -
Black - 70%
Hispanic - 20%
Other - 10%
Station is both owned and managed by minorities.
KKGO
L.A. radio station, formerly jazz, now jazz and classical.
Listeners' Demographics (as supplied by station, for jazz format)
Age: 25 - 54
Male/Female: 50/50
Income: $75,000 (professional types)
Race -
White - 75%
Black - 20%
Other - 5%
Station representative said that they expect the demographics that represent the new format to be
similar, though they do expect to lose some of the black and Hispanic audience.
Station is managed by black, Hispanic, Filipino minorities.
WBGO
Newark, N.J., public jazz station.
Listeners' Demographics
Age: 30 - 55
Male/Female: 65/35
Income: $35,000+
Race-
White - 50%
Black - 25%
Latin - 25%
There is no significant minority ownership or management.
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KKSF
San Francisco jazz, new-age station.
Listeners' Demographics
Age: 25-54
Male/Female: 50/50
Income: $50,000+
Race-
White - 80%
Black - 10%
Hispanic - 4%
Other - 6%
There is no significant minority ownership or management.
KBLX
San Francisco R&B, jazz, adult-contemporary station.
Listeners' Demographics
Age: 25-54
Male/Female: 55/45
Income: $100,000+
Race-
White - 50%
Black - 40%
Other - 10%
The station is minority owned but not minority operated.
KJAZ
Alameda (San Francisco) jazz station.
Listeners' Demographics (as supplied by station)
Age: 25-54
Male/Female: 66/33
Income: $32,000
Race-
White - 75%
Black - 16%
Hispanic - 4%
Other - 5%
The station is not owned or managed by minorities. It was formerly owned in partnership with
Lionel Wilson, the (black) mayor of Oakland, but Wilson was bought out eight years ago.
KLON
Long Beach public jazz station.
Listeners' Demographics
Age: 30-60
Male/Female: 70/30
Income: $40,000
Race-
White - 33.3%
Black - 33.3%
Other - 33.3%
The station is owned by Cal State Long Beach. Upper management is mostly white.
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In addition, there is the possibility that owners gave strategic
responses. This questionnaire may have been perceived as a policymak-
ing tool by the owners, who may have dissembled in an effort to shift
federal policy toward minority preferences in broadcasting.143
3. Summary and Conclusions
The problems with the extant data would prevent any reputable
social scientist from placing much weight upon them. But faced with the
need to come to a decision about the legality of the minority preference
policies, a court would have to give more serious consideration to the
data. Even so, the early data do virtually nothing to shed light on which
of three theoretical positions-"no difference," "taste," or "cost advan-
tage"-is most likely. The CRS study is a small advance and suggests
that either the taste hypothesis or the monitoring-cost advantage is the
most likely one (although the "no difference" position cannot be ruled
out completely). In particular, the monitoring-cost explanation does the
best job of predicting the general pattern of CRS results. However,
because the CRS failed to evaluate its data against the background of a
microeconomic model such as the one presented in this Article, we have
no way of knowing how large such a monitoring-cost advantage is likely
WBEZ
Chicago public radio station providing jazz in the evening.
Listeners' Demographics
Age: 25-44
Male/Female: 60/40
Income: $40,000 - $75,000
Race-
White - 91.9%
Black - 8.1%
The station's license is held by the Chicago Board of Education; general superintendent of schools
and president of the Board of Education are black. There is significant minority management; the
new director is a black woman, the station manager a white woman.
WQCD
New York jazz-contemporary station.
Listeners' Demographics
Age: 25-44
Male/Female: 60/40
Race-
White - 45%
Black - 45%
Hispanic - 10%
Owned by Tribune Corp. No significant minority management.
143. In addition, there is the possibility that minority owners' choice of station location was
determined by social factors and that location determined broadcast content. See supra note 118 and
accompanying text. Hence, the data would be worthless for appraising a policy that just targets
minority owners' characteristics, rather than station location.
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to be for each of the groups or, similarly, how strong is the taste for
broadcasting for one's own group.
IV. METRO BROADCASTING V. FCC
In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,1 4 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the minority preference in comparative hearings and the minority
distress-sale policy by an identical five-to-four vote. Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, and Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissenters,
disagreed on the role of evidence in determining the relationship between
owners' characteristics and their programming choices, as well as just
about everything else. I will review Metro Broadcasting and highlight the
correspondence between the Court's normative presuppositions and
jurisprudential approach, as well as the evaluation of the theory and data
showing a nexus between ownership characteristics and broadcasting
diversity. 145
A. THE DisPumS
Metro Broadcasting challenged the minority preference in compara-
tive hearings when Metro lost its bid to gain the license to construct a
new UHF television station near Orlando, Florida. The FCC granted the
application to a competitor, in part because the competitor was 90% His-
panic owned, while Metro was only 19.8% minority owned. The com-
petitor's advantage in minority ownership outweighed Metro's
advantages in other areas. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld the license award against the claim that comparative-
hearing preferences for minorities violated equal protection under the
fifth amendment. 146
144. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
145. A thorough evaluation of racial preferences requires subtle and complex normative, polit-
ical, historical, economic, and psychological arguments. I have no such grand ambitions for this
Article. For a good discussion of many of these issues, see T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC
OR REALITY? (1984); Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987); Ely, The Constitutionality ofReverse
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723 (1974); Karst, Private Discrimination and Public
Responsibility: Patterson In Context, 1989 Sup. Cr. REV. 1; Kennedy, Persuasion and Distnst: A
Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1986); Rosenfeld, Decoding
Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 1729 (1989); Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Aff rmative Action Cases, 100
HARV. L. REv. 78 (1986); Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or
Structural Justice?, 92 HARv. L. REV. 864 (1979). For a public-choice theoretic analysis of Bakke,
see Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Application of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the
FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717 (1979).
146. Winter Park Communications v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom.,
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
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Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, wholly owned by Alan
Shurberg, applied for a construction permit for a television station in
Hartford, Connecticut. The permit would have been inconsistent with
the continued operation of another television station, owned by Faith
Center. Faith Center had been in some trouble with the FCC for years,
and for three years it had been attempting to sell its license to a minority
purchaser in a "distress sale." Faith Center's first two attempts to exe-
cute a distress sale failed when the purchasers' financing fell through. Six
months after Shurberg's application Faith Center asked the FCC for per-
mission to try a third time to execute a distress sale, this time to
Astroline Communications. Shurberg opposed the distress-sale policy as
a violation of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. After the
FCC rejected Shurberg's opposition and approved Faith Center's petition
for a distress-sale, Shurberg appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court of appeals ulti-
mately ruled in Shurberg's favor.147
The Supreme Court agreed to hear appeals from both decisions and
consolidated the cases. The following sections will detail the majority
and dissent, highlighting their views on the role of evidence on the con-
nection between ownership characteristics and programming choices.
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Brennan, writing for Justices Blackmun, Marshall, White,
and Stevens, held that benign racial classifications enacted by the United
States Congress pass the requirements of equal protection if "they serve
important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." '48 In short, this
test requires the court to look for good reasons that serve as the ultimate
objective of the challenged law and then determine if racial classifications
implement the objective at sufficiently low cost. This approach was
culled from two of the four Supreme Court opinions evaluating the con-
stitutionality of programs that use explicit racial classifications to help
minority groups and disadvantage whites.149
147. Shurberg Broadcasting v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub non, Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
148. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3009.
149. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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The first of these, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 150
tested the legality of a medical-school affirmative action program. The
University of California at Davis medical school had set aside sixteen
places in its class exclusively for minorities. Whites could compete for
the other eighty-four places. Only five members of the Court addressed
the constitutional issue of whether the U.C. Davis program violated the
fourteenth amendment. Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justices
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, applied a form of intermediate scrutiny
virtually identical to that adopted in Metro Broadcasting. Brennan
upheld the U.C. Davis program, first finding that remedying society-wide
discrimination provided an important governmental interest and then
holding that setting aside some places in the class for minorities was sub-
stantially related to remedying discrimination. Justice Powell, in a piv-
otal opinion, applied strict scrutiny-demanding a compelling state
interest and demanding that the racially explicit criteria be narrowly tai-
lored and necessary to achieving the compelling state interest. Remedy-
ing societal discrimination, said Justice Powell, was not a compelling
state interest because it is completely unbounded. However, producing a
racially diverse student body would be a compelling state interest, for
much informal learning takes place through casual interaction, and a
diversity of backgrounds in student bodies produces more learning. But,
Justice Powell cautioned, race must not be the only factor, for other ele-
ments also aid learning. Therefore, race must be balanced and weighed
against other elements, such as "personal talents, unique work or service
experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a
history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the
poor."' 1
51
The second case, Fullilove v. Klutznick,15 2 produced many opinions.
The Supreme Court upheld a provision of the Public Works Employment
Act of 1977153 that required that ten percent of all expended funds be
spent on minority-owned businesses, unless that turned out to be infeasi-
ble. Chief Justice Burger's opinion, joined by Justices White and Powell,
was very deferential to Congress and refused to rely on any of the legal
tests in Bakke. Instead, Burger pointed out that this program originated
under the spending power of the Constitution,"5 4 an independent grant of
power to Congress that reaches as far as any of the regulatory powers of
150. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
151. Id. at 317.
152. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
153. Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116.
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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Congress, such as the commerce power."'5 The commerce power, said
Burger, clearly gives Congress the power to regulate prime contractors
on federally funded projects. As to state and local governments, section
5 of the fourteenth amendment provides enabling power. When legislat-
ing to remedy lingering effects of discrimination, "Congress, of course,
may legislate without compiling the kind of 'record' appropriate with
respect to judicial or administrative proceedings." ' 6 But Burger did
point out that Congress had data on disparity of contract procurement at
federal as well as state and local levels, from which it could conclude that
this regulation was needed. Burger was clearly worried about the thin-
ness of the factual record, but he pushed the worries aside with refer-
ences to the power of Congress in this area.
Justice Marshall, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, concurred in
the judgment. Marshall argued, on the basis of his Bakke opinion, for
middle-tier scrutiny of explicit racial classifications that disadvantage
whites; the classification for "remedial purposes [must] serve important
governmental objectives" and must be "substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives." ' 7 Congress had more than enough data from
which to conclude that the small percentage of federal construction dol-
lars was the product of prior discrimination, and the ten-percent set aside
was closely related to eradicating the effects of discrimination, said
Marshall.
At the start of his analysis in Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan
cited Fulliove for a general presumption in Congress's favor.1 58 Next,
Brennan found that "programming diversity" represents an important
governmental interest that could potentially support constitutional pref-
erence policies. The government must license and regulate broadcasting,
argued Brennan, because broadcasting, unlike other media, is plagued by
scarcity. 159 Broadcasters hold their licenses only as fiduciaries for the
155. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 474-75.
156. Id. at 478.
157. Id. at 519.
158. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3008.
159. Id. at 3010. The scarcity rationale has recently come under intense attack from both the
bench and commentators, leading to speculation that the current system of broadcasting regulation
might be declared unconstitutional. See generally Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broad-
casting, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 990 (1989) (providing a skeptical critique of the arguments for licensing).
Brennan's declaration of scarcity's legitimacy reduces the likelihood that broadcasting regulation
will be held unconstitutional in the near future.
The Court could have reached much the same conclusion without relying on the widely discred-
ited scarcity theory. Instead, the Court could have held that the federal government has enough of
an ownership interest in the airwaves to give it a speech interest in the content of broadcasting. For
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public, and it is the right of the public to have the medium function con-
sistently with the "ends and purposes" of the first amendment that are
paramount. In a natural corollary, the government has a strong interest
in enhancing broadcast diversity, and this interest is important enough to
support minority preferences. Brennan appealed to Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke, which held that school admissions processes that used
race as one of several criteria of desirability could be constitutional
because such admissions processes promote "diverse student" bodies." °
Diverse student bodies helped to promote a robust exchange of ideas and
were, for Powell, a compelling state interest. In a similar fashion, broad-
cast diversity also "serves important First Amendment values."
' 161
Next, Brennan moved on to the question of whether there exists a
"substantial relationship" between broadcast diversity and minority pref-
erence policies. Congress and the FCC, declared Brennan, enjoy a strong
presumption of expertise on the complex factual question about the con-
nection between ownership characteristics and programming choices.
162
On several occasions the FCC found that minority ownership increases
broadcast diversity, and these findings were consistent with the FCC's
long-standing policy of trying to influence diversity by controlling the
ownership of broadcasting licenses. Brennan was extremely deferential
to the FCC on this score.163 First, Brennan refused to look behind the
FCC's "findings" to examine the Commission's data. When courts take
a more skeptical attitude they will examine underlying data. 164 Second,
the majority accepted a straightforward analogy between the Commis-
sion's multiple-ownership rules-the prior attempt to influence diversity
a sophisticated working-out of the implications of the government having speech interests, see Shif-
frin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565 (1980). Shiffrin applies his ideas to broadcasting in
id. at 581-88, 644-45.
160. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-13 (1978).
161. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3001. For a good discussion of how this represents a
radical break from prior first amendment doctrine, see Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin
and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. - (forthcoming).
162. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3011.
163. By characterizing Brennan's opinions as deferential to, or perhaps quite friendly to, the
FCC and Congress, I intend neither any accolade nor any criticism. It is just my impression of the
treatment Brennan accorded to the FCC and to Congress.
164. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see also Century Communications v. FCC, 835
F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (characterizing FCC regulations as based on dubious assertions rather
than substantial evidence), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d
1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Evidence did not support the FCC's claim that regulations were necessary to
protect the economic health of local broadcast television.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); HBO
v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Mathematical models and scanty facts did not prove the
existence of a problem justifying FCC regulation.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
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by controlling ownership-and minority preference policies.16  The mul-
tiple-ownership polices attempt to increase broadcast diversity by
increasing the number of separate entities owning broadcasting stations,
without regard to their other characteristics. So, for example, the multi-
ple-ownership rules prevent anyone from owning more than one televi-
sion station in the same city. 6' The rationale for these rules is that more
voices will increase the number of views on issues of public importance
(as well as make the market for advertising time more competitive).167
But nothing about these rules categorizes broadcasting by racial or ethnic
point of view or claims that a nexus exists between ethnicity, race, or sex
and broadcast diversity. Brennan's refusal to see any of these potential
distinctions between the multiple-ownership rules and the minority pref-
erence policies stemmed directly from his deferential attitude.
Next, Brennan reviewed Congress's findings that minority owner-
ship increases broadcast diversity, extending Congress every presumption
and refusing to see potential problems. Brennan counted a great volume
of testimony and documentary evidence presented to Congress over the
past twenty years in other contexts as support for the preference policies.
Ambiguous evidence culled from bills that failed to pass was listed as
clear support for Congress's finding of a connection,16 and the modem
record was characterized in the most favorable light.69
The nexus between ownership characteristics and programming
choices is not the same thing as impermissible stereotyping, Brennan
assured, because the nexus is only statistical, rather than an assertion that
165. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3012 n.16.
166. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
167. Lago, The Price Effects of Joint Mass Communication Median Ownership, 16 ANTTRUST
BULL. 789 (1971); Owen, Newspaper and Television Joint Ownership, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 787
(1973).
168. For example, Justice Brennan lists Congress's refusal to pass a bill that would have elimi-
nated comparative hearings in broadcast-license renewals. Congress heard testimony that compara-
tive hearings at renewal time gave minorities a chance to get into the broadcasting business. Metro
Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3013 n.17. The problem with this sort of evidence is that Congress may
have completely rejected this testimony and refused to pass the bill for another reason. In fact,
Congress did not proceed with the bill because the FCC adopted a renewal policy, ultimately over-
turned in Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), that adopted the
bill's restrictions on renewal challenges. Once we understand these facts-that the bill was enacted
by administrative order, that Congress lost interest at that point, and that there was no Congres-
sional move to reinstate true comparative-renewal challenges after the FCC's move to choke them
offi-it seems much more likely that Congress rejected the testimony to which Brennan refers.
169. For example, the CRS study's language suggesting that there is some support for the nexus
was not quoted. Instead, Brennan quoted Senator Hollings saying that the study "clearly demon-
strates that minority ownership of broadcast stations does increase the diversity of viewpoints
presented over the airwaves." Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3016.
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all owners of a certain type would program in a certain way. Congress's
and the FCC's conclusion that this statistical nexus exists is supported
"by a host of empirical evidence."17 Brennan's review of the data
revealed all the deference to Congress that his earlier pronouncements
suggested he would extend.171 Furthermore, much of the evidence per-
tained to treatment of news and public affairs or concerned the hiring
practices of minority owners on the theory that minority employees
would program differently than white employees. 172
The "substantial relationship" prong of the test requires the Court
to ask if the challenged policies are too costly in any of several ways.
First, there must be no alternative policy that will accomplish the pur-
poses of the challenged laws at a much lower cost. Brennan reviewed the
history of FCC attempts to encourage diversity without resort to explicit
racial classification. Brennan recounted the "Blue Book's" requirement
in 1946 that licensees program unsponsored matter, the FCC's increasing
emphasis on ascertainment of community needs throughout the 1960s,
culminating in the draconian Primer on Ascertainment of Community
Problems by Broadcast Applicants173 in 1971, and the denial of licenses
for failure to adequately learn of the needs and interests of minority lis-
teners.1 74 Because the FCC had tried alternatives in the past and found
them wanting, it was justified in resorting to racial classifications. 171 In
the footnotes Brennan confronted the much thornier questions of
whether the FCC might better encourage diversity either by directly
requiring diverse programming 176 or through untried race-neutral alter-
natives. Brennan danced lightly around the issue of directly requiring
diverse programming, first claiming that any such direct requirement
would produce huge administrative burdens because of the FCC's need
to learn the needs of communities and to monitor broadcaster perform-
ance. Second, any FCC policy requiring diverse programming might
170. Id. at 3017.
171. Brennan accepted the CRS study's conclusions and figures without looking to see if the
data might be worthless or if the conclusions followed from the data. See id. at 3017 n.31. He also
cited the working paper upon which this Article is based, M. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Prefer-
ences in Broadcasting 19-29 (California Institute of Technology Working Paper No. 718, 1990), cited
in Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3017 n.31. Although the parenthetical after the cite is accurate
enough, my paper hardly supports the ringing, unequivocal statement in Brennan's text.
172. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3017-18 nn.32-34.
173. 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971).
174. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3019-21.
175. Id. at 3022.
176. Id. at 3019 n.36.
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raise "serious first amendment issues." 177 Next, Brennan turned aside
any suggestion that other, race-neutral alternatives must be tried instead
of the minority preference policies, and he did so on grounds of almost
pure deference: "The Commission has ... concluded that these [race-
neutral] efforts cannot substitute for its minority ownership policies."' 178
Last, Brennan turned to a constellation of considerations that usu-
ally get lumped together under the "substantial relationship" inquiry.
First, laws including explicit racial classifications are supposed to be of
limited duration and undergo reevaluation at regular intervals. These
evaluations are supposed to reveal when the program is no longer
needed. 79 The minority preferences passed muster because they were
included in periodic appropriations legislation, because the FCC was to
monitor the situation, 180 and because the goal of programming diversity
would stop justifying the program whenever "sufficient diversity has been
achieved."'' Second, Brennan found that the challenged policies placed
no undue burdens on innocent nonminorities. Nonminority applicants
for licenses had no legitimate expectation of gaining the license in a race-
neutral process.' 82 Last, in a footnote, the majority confronted the most
disturbing contention-that the minority preferences had been used by
nonminorities who conspired with minority frontmen to fool the FCC
and gain the advantages under the policies. Brennan's response rested on
the FCC's duty to detect sham filings but did not investigate the utility of
the FCC's watchdog function. A more skeptical majority might have
177. Id. Brennan apparently believed that one problem with the direct requirement of diversity
was that the government must define various viewpoints and then determine which were under-
represented. Id. The virtue of the minority-preference policies is that they avoid all this. Id. at
3021-22 n.40. But Brennan nowhere explained how the government could know whether or not its
policy was working without performing exactly these functions. This is just one more bit of evidence
that Congress and the FCC received very friendly treatment from the majority.
For an analysis of the debate between Brennan and O'Connor on the first amendment issue
involved in directly requiring diversity, see Eule, supra note 161.
178. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3022-23 n.42. The need for deference was increased,
claimed the majority, by the FCC's and Congress's consideration and rejection of other measures
designed to aid minorities in broadcasting. Id. at 3023.
179. Id. at 3022.
180. Actually, the FCC has been directed to report on the efficacy of the minority preferences
contained in the lottery statute. Id. at 3025. It is one more mark of the majority's friendly treatment
of these preferences that the report on the lottery was listed among the devices for monitoring the
comparative-hearing preference and the distress-sale policy.
181. Id.
182. A subsidiary issue is whether the distress-sale policy places too much of a burden on
nonminorities who are completely excluded from consideration from stations sold in distress sales.
The comparative hearing, in contrast, makes race one factor among many. Brennan turned aside
this challenge, arguing that only a few stations were subject to distress sales and that nonminority
applicants could apply for other licenses. Id. at 3027.
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inquired into the adequacy of the FCC's monitoring to date or even into
the possibility of monitoring these problems. Brennan, however, was
deferential. 18 3
C. THE DISSENT
Justice O'Connor, writing in dissent for Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, disagreed with just about everything in the
majority opinion. Starting with the principle that the Constitution pre-
vents Congress from granting or denying property rights to "individuals
based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act
or think," 114 O'Connor required that all racially explicit classifications
pass strict scrutiny. The government must have a compelling interest
(not merely an important one), must need to use racial classifications,
and must narrowly tailor the classifications to achieve the compelling
interest (rather than merely produce a substantial relationship between
the interest and the classification)."l 5 The Court, O'Connor argued,
recently held in Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 186 that state programs using
racial classifications must pass extremely strict scrutiny and Congress
must, in general, be subject to the same strict standard.1 8 7
In Croson, the city of Richmond, Virginia, adopted a five-year plan
requiring all prime contractors other than those owned by minorities to
subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of any contracts
with Richmond to minority business enterprises ("MBEs"). I" Witnesses
183. Id. at 3025 n.48. Again, my characterization of Brennan as deferential is intended to sug-
gest neither approval nor disapproval.
Justice Stevens concurred, emphasizing that "racial or ethnic characteristics provide a relevant
basis for disparate treatment only in extremely rare situations." Id. at 3028. I would make more of
this concurrence had Justice Brennan not resigned during the preparation of this Article. I think
Justice Brennan's replacement is so likely to make a difference in all future affirmative action cases
that speculating upon the limits of Justice Stevens's willingness to go along with the liberal position
is beside the point.
184. Id. at 3029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
185. Id.
186. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
187. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3029-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor conceded
that Congress had greater powers under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. But that section
allowed Congress to move to remedy racial discrimination by the states. The policies at issue here
were entirely creatures of the federal government and were not intended ,as remedial measures,
O'Connor contended, and hence did not rate the more relaxed review that the Court afforded the set-
aside programs in Fullilove. Id. at 3031-32.
188. An MBE was one owned or controlled at least 51% by minority-group members. A
minority was defined as "[c]itizens of the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals,
Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 478 (1989).
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at the public hearings preceding adoption of the plan introduced consid-
erable evidence of societal discrimination in construction contracting but
introduced "no direct evidence of race discrimination on the part of the
city."' 18 9 J.A. Croson Co., a plumbing contractor that was not allowed to
raise its bid by the $7,663.16 in extra costs occasioned by the higher
prices quoted by the only MBE subcontractor who was willing to bid on
the project, sued Richmond, claiming that the thirty-percent plan vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.
Justice O'Connor, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice White, distinguished Fullilove by pointing out that that case's valida-
tion of explicit racial classifications rested on the "unique" remedial
powers of Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.1 90
Next, O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy, reaffirmed a
strict scrutiny approach to all racial classifications, based in part on a
"danger of stigmatic harm," but also based on the perception that this
thirty-percent plan was nothing more than racial pork barrel for the
politically dominant black majority in Richmond. 91 Then, joined also
by Stevens (and therefore comprising a majority), O'Connor found that
general discrimination in the construction industry did not provide a
compelling government reason for an explicit racial classification.1 92
189. Id. at 480.
190. The fourteenth amendment reads, in part, as follows:
Section 1 ..... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provision of this article and the flexibility built in to the 10% set aside by the administra-
tive procedures for waiver.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress broad
authority "to identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination" but gives no such
authority to state and local governments, who are bound by section 1 of the fourteenth amendment.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 490. In effect, argued O'Connor, power was reallocated from the states to Con-
gress by section 5. Hence, Fullilove could be distinguished, for Congress has much greater power
than a city. For Richmond to prevail, it would at least have to show that it had become a "passive
participant" in race discrimination by the local construction industry and was now attempting to
remedy its involvement in discrimination. Id. at 492.
191. "In this case, blacks comprise approximately 50% of the population of the city of Rich-
mond. Five of the nine seats on the City Council are held by blacks." Id. at 495.
192. O'Connor listed the five findings of fact that the district court had found to justify remedial
action:
(1) the ordinance declares itself to be remedial; (2) several proponents of the measure
stated their views that there had been past discrimination in the construction industry; (3)
minority businesses received 0.67% of prime contracts from the city while minorities con-
stituted 50% of the city's population; (4) there were very few minority contractors in local
and state contractors' associations; and (5) in 1977, Congress made a determination that
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Instead, O'Connor appeared to demand evidence of something
"approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory viola-
tion" by someone in the Richmond construction industry.1
93
Justice Kennedy, concurring in part in Croson, was openly skeptical
of the argument about section 5 of the fourteenth amendment giving
Congress greater power to use racial classifications than the states have.
He also expressed support for Scalia's argument that race may never be
used for anything other than a remedy. Justice Scalia, concurring in
Croson, decried the use of race for nonremedial purposes, and he almost
entirely embraced O'Connor's theory of section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment to distinguish Fullilove.1 94
In Metro Broadcasting the dissenters argued that the minority pref-
erence policies fail strict scrutiny. First, the goal for broadcast diversity
is neither compelling nor even important. Such a goal is so amorphous
as to lend itself to abuse, both as a justification for a program with poten-
tially infinite life and as a justification for discriminating against almost
anyone. 195
The policies also fail because they are not narrowly tailored, claimed
O'Connor. The use of a statistical relationship between race and pro-
gramming is unlawful because the government should not presume that
race causes conduct, particularly when there are other, more direct
methods of accomplishing the goals.19 6 The dissenters regarded the
majority's reliance upon a statistical nexus as particularly galling because
the Constitution requires that the relationship between race and conduct
be nearly perfect. Against this standard, the evidence fails to support the
the effects of past discrimination had stifled minority participation in the construction
industry nationally.
Id. at 499. She then refuted each of them, at length, showing that they were insufficient to support
an explicit racial classification. Id. at 500-505.
193. Id. at 500. Note that the list of evidence in Croson was not much less than Congress had in
Fullilove when it justified the 10% set-aside. So, for at least Stevens and Kennedy, and perhaps also
for O'Connor, Rehnquist, and White, there was a strong hint of a new willingness to examine legisla-
tive fact finding, at least at the state and local level.
There was, simultaneously, a trend of reducing the scope of federal civil rights laws. See Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (allowing litigation of racially explicit consent decrees designed to
remedy past discrimination where litigants were not parties to original action); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (refusing to apply 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to employer conduct after the
formation of the employment contract); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)
(requiring plaintiffs to shoulder heavier burdens when proving a "disparate-impact" case under title
VII).
194. Croson, 488 U.S. at 520-24.
195. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3034-35. The dissent also suggested that the goal of
choosing among viewpoints might violate the first amendment. Id. at 3036.
196. Id. at 3037-40.
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policies. Congress stopped the FCC's investigation of the relationship
between race and programming choices. Congressional declarations that
the nexus existed were irrelevant, and the legislative reports that "claim
some nexus to exist refer to sources that provide no support for the prop-
osition."' 197 In sum, the dissenters were extremely skeptical of Congress
and its data.
D. THE OPINIONS' USE OF EVIDENCE OF THE NEXUS
AND AN ALTERNATIVE
The opinions in Metro Broadcasting addressed many issues, but the
most important ones involved the appropriateness of intermediate or
strict scrutiny in cases of benign discrimination; the role of nonremedial
governmental interests, such as diversity in broadcasting or diversity in
student bodies, as important or compelling governmental interests; and
the panoply of issues included in the substantial relationship (or "nar-
rowly tailored" and "necessary" in the case of strict scrutiny) inquiry,
including the quality of evidence needed to sustain a governmental pro-
gram. I take no position on the appropriateness of intermediate or strict
scrutiny in cases of benign discrimination. I will presume, for the sake of
analysis, that broadcast diversity is an important or compelling govern-
ment interest. I focus solely on the third set of issues, particularly the
quality of evidence needed to sustain a governmental program.198
I will focus briefly on the question of the evidence at the core of the
substantial relation issue (or "narrowly tailored" and "necessary" issues
in the case of strict scrutiny) in order to make three straightforward
points: (1) The evidence cannot be said to establish (or disprove) the
nexus between ethnicity, race, or sex and broadcast content as a matter
of pure fact. Instead, the normative presuppositions and jurisprudential
approach largely determine the Court's evaluation of the data. (2) The
majority and dissent's treatment of the evidence on the nexus reveal that
197. Id. at 3043. Justice O'Connor also found that the minority preference policies put undue
burdens on individual nonminorities. Id.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, also wrote a separate, scathing dissent in which he
compared the majority opinion to the "separate but equal" doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896). Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3044.
198. For what it is worth, I believe that Metro Broadcasting, when read next to the other affirm-
ative action cases, establishes that federal programs will be treated with far more deference on virtu-
ally every legal issue than will state or local programs. Further, the most interesting issues for the
immediate future will concern the degree to which federal power to discriminate benignly can be
explicitly delegated to state and local governments and what degree of ongoing active supervision,
similar to the requirement for state action immunity in antitrust, will be required. But I have no
great insights on these concerns.
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the majority applied a very deferential form of intermediate scrutiny and
that the dissent adopted a very skeptical version of strict scrutiny. (3)
There is a level of review that lies between the majority's deference and
the dissent's skepticism, and this truly intermediate review would lead
the Court to demand a different form of minority preferences.
The majority and dissent had two wildly different views of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence of a nexus between ownership characteristics and
programming choice. Not only did the majority and dissent differ over
their appraisal of the evidence, but they also differed over which institu-
tion should decide, as a matter of first course, how good the evidence
was. The majority showed great deference to Congress, in effect giving
the job of appraising the evidence to Congress and its agent, the FCC.
The dissent would have none of this, implicitly assuming that it was the
Court's job. These differences flowed directly from the divergent norms
that animated Justice Brennan and Justice O'Connor. Brennan believed
that benign discrimination by Congress deserved a highly deferential
form of review, but O'Connor regarded all forms of discrimination as
potentially invidious and therefore requiring strict scrutiny. Brennan's
approach led him to regard the Congressional Research Study, the theo-
ries in this Article, the body of literature reviewed in this Article, Con-
gressional declarations, data on hiring practices, and so forth as relevant
and more than enough to support Congress's use of the minority prefer-
ences. In contrast, O'Connor's highly skeptical approach led her to
require that the connection between ownership characteristics and pro-
gramming behavior be almost perfect. None of the evidence purported
to show any such thing, so she naturally found the data completely
unsatisfactory.
There is a middle ground between the extremely deferential majority
approach that regards virtually any evidence as sufficient and the
extremely skeptical dissenting approach that requires evidence of a per-
fect relationship between ownership characteristics and programming.
This true intermediate approach could be fashioned in any number of
ways, but for our purposes we will assume that it uses the same legal
formulation as Justice Brennan's opinion: A benign racial classification
must bear a substantial relationship to an important governmental pur-
pose. We will further assume that broadcast diversity can be an impor-
tant governmental purpose. However, on the question of substantial
relationship, a true intermediate approach might demand a much better
fit between the goal and the explicit racial classifications.
JUSTIFYING MINORITY PREFERENCES
To understand the sorts of demands that might be made under the
question of substantial relationship, we must distinguish between the
quality of the evidence and that which the evidence goes to establish. In
the case of minority preferences in broadcasting, we might say, for exam-
ple, that in the Los Angeles market, awarding a new radio license to a
black owner produces a twenty-percent chance that the radio station will
aim for the black audience but that awarding the radio license to a white
owner produces only a five-percent chance that the new radio station will
aim for the black audience. We might make such a statement for either
of two reasons. The basic theory of radio programming might suggest
that a new black owner is only twenty percent likely to serve the black
audience and that a white owner is only five percent likely to serve the
black audience, while our evidence for applying the theory in this cir-
cumstance might be excellent. Or our theory might suggest that the cor-
relation between race and programming is nearly perfect, but we might
have very weak evidence to suggest applying the theory. In the case of
minority preferences, the substantial relationship issue had both
problems. The basic theory suggested only a probablistic relationship,
and the data proving the theory were less than overwhelming.
A truly intermediate substantial relationship test could require two
things. First, it could demand better evidence that the fundamental the-
ory for the relationship between ethnicity, sex, and programming content
is true. A more sophisticated, completed version of the CRS survey
would be a good start. Second, minority preferences could be reformu-
lated in ways that use the central insight produced by Part II of this
Article: Minority preferences are not always equally likely to produce
increases in broadcast diversity. In certain market settings, broadcasting
minority programming is much less expensive than in other settings. To
tailor the relationship between minority status and broadcast program-
ming, the law could accord an applicant (or buyer) seeking to make use
of the minority preferences a hearing at which the issue would be, What
is the likelihood that the exercise of a minority preference in this particu-
lar case will increase diversity in programming? The parties would be
allowed to present evidence on the factors that theory suggested were
most important: Is there a substantial minority population in this mar-
ket? Is the minority population currently unserved? How many outlets
are there in the market? What is the cost of minority programming ver-
sus nonminority programming? In this way, the new policy would be
keyed directly to the theory of the market and would increase the
probability that minority preferences would produce broadcast diversity.
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Under a level of scrutiny that is intermediate between that of the major-
ity and that of the dissent, the reformulated minority preferences might
survive.199
None of this has been intended to show that the nexus really does or
does not exist. Nor has any of the discussion been intended to suggest
that the minority preference policies are good or bad. Instead, this dis-
cussion has attempted to suggest that the Court's normative presupposi-
tion and jurisprudential approach largely determine the Court's view of
the evidence. In addition, it is possible to reformulate the minority pref-
erences; applicants could attempt to show that they are very likely to
contribute to broadcast diversity. There is an intermediate position on
the issue of substantial relationship (or necessity and narrow tailoring)
that corresponds to the reformulated minority preferences. The exist-
ence of this intermediate position in turn reveals the extent to which the
majority in Metro Broadcasting deferred to Congress while the dissent
exercised extreme skepticism.
V. CONCLUSION
Do minority station owners program differently from white owners?
The simplest theory-that minority and white owners both maximize the
profit potential of a given market-suggests that they behave the same
way. Other theories, based either on the value to owners of program-
ming for their own group or on the value of minority principal/minority
agent cost savings, suggest that minorities and whites may program dif-
ferently. This is particularly likely in markets with large numbers of
minorities in the audience, where there are large numbers of broadcasting
stations, and where none of the stations are yet serving minority audi-
ences. In markets that do not satisfy one or more of these conditions, the
theoretical chance that a minority owner will program differently from a
white owner declines. The evidence, such as it is, could be consistent
with any hypothesis. Certainly no strong presumption in favor of any
theory would be disturbed by the evidence.
Metro Broadcasting indirectly confirmed this view of the theory and
evidence. The majority, adopting an extremely deferential version of
intermediate review, indulged a strong presumption in favor of the causal
nexus between minority status and programming choices. For the major-
ity, the evidence reviewed in this Article and elsewhere provided more
199. This is, in essence, the FCC position that was rejected in TV 9 v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
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than enough of a record to justify the minority preference policies. The
dissent, however, took the opposite point of view. Racially explicit laws
were viewed with great suspicion and had to overcome strong presump-
tions against their legitimacy. Nothing in the theory or evidence came
close to satisfying the dissent's highly skeptical version of strict scrutiny.
